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Introduction

4

War is both king of all and father of all, and it has
revealed some as gods, others as men,
it has made some slaves, others free.
Heraclitus, no. 22 fragment B53
"You want to know what Classics are?" said a drunk
Dean of Admissions to me at a faculty party a
couple of years ago. "I'll tell you what Classics are.
Wars and homos."
A sententious and vulgar statement, certainly, but
like many such gnomic vulgarities, it also contains
a tiny splinter of truth.
The Secret History, Donna Tartt

One of the hallmarks of St. Augustine's political thought was his elaboration of
the idea of the Just War. His initial writings would later become the foundation of Just
War Theory, a doctrine with numerous defendants and discreditors throughout the history
of European thought. The most respected contemporary articulation of Just War tradition
is, undoubtedly, Michael Walzer's "Just and Unjust Wars". However, in the opening of
his book, Walzer denies that Just War Theory is only a European tradition: "As long as
men and women have talked about war, they have talked about it in terms of right and
wrongi." His comment suggests that there is an almost universal aspect to Just War
Theory and that while there is a European Just War tradition, a Just War Theory could be
constructed for other societies.
The Greeks talked about war and they talked about it in terms of right and wrong.
But given the intensely military nature of Ancient Greek society and the fierce concern
with justice in Greek philosophy, it is surprising that no Greek thinker fully articulated
the idea of Just War. The purpose of this essay, however, is not to propose a reason for
this curious lack in Greek discourse, but rather to tease out the discourse about the
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morality of war that did occur in Greek texts. In short, I want to test Walzer's theory
about the universality of humanity's concerns of the morality of war by applying it to
Ancient Greece. I wish to do this by investigating the discourse about justice and war
within the texts of Herodotos, Thucydides, Plato and Aristotle. Before I embark on this
analysis, I will first establish the historical context of these thinkers in relation to Greek
warfare. For while the violence, sorrow and tyranny of warfare is one of the few intense
experiences that still links contemporary readers to the ancient world, there is no essential
nature to warfare. Because war does change with time, it is necessary to understand the
types of war that these writers were thinking about when they wrote about war.
Historical context is important for these authors.
That Just War Theory has peace as its ultimate goal between all states is perhaps
one of the primary reasons that the Ancient Greeks did not conceive of it. For while
Aristotle wrote that the aim of war should be peace (Politics 1333b37), he nonetheless
found the preparation for war an excellent chance to "exercise leadership (1333b37)". In
other thinkers, and in Greek society in general, there is no doubt that war was celebrated,
not only for the ends that it brought about, namely freedom, autonomy and plunder, but
as an end. War was celebrated as war, not simply something that must be tolerated. In
order to understand how war, one of the most feared events in our times and also in
antiquity, could be celebrated, I suggest that we turn towards the idea of creative war.
Ruskin defines this curious term: "creative or foundational war… that in which
the natural restlessness and love of contest are disciplined by consent, into modes of
beautiful -though it may be fatal- play…ii" Creative war is warfare that has the consent
of all its combatants and has little to no serious political outcomes. A creative war is one
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that is both limited in its consequences outside the battlefield and is fought purely for the
love of conflictiii. For Greek society, this term is essential for describing the ritualistic
aspect of their warfare, whether Homeric warriors or the hoplite phalanx. For both the
Homeric warrior and the citizen-hoplite were not only concerned with winning the war,
but winning it with honor. However, while we have examples of limited wars in Ancient
Greece, there is no evidence of purely creative warfare. By limited war I mean a war
which although it has political consequences, such as the destruction or liberation of a
city, nonetheless both sides follow conventions prevent the war from becoming total war.
For even in the most extensive document on Homeric warfare, the Iliad, honor focused
war had a serious political outcome: The destruction of a city.
The opposite of creative war is total war. Total war is unlimited in the sense of
having no conventions concerning the proper reasons to go to war or the proper way to
fight. Total war is fought not for the love of conflict but to gain political superiority.
Walzer highlights that the significant difference between creative war and the experience
of total war as being lack of consentiv. Creative war retains its playful nature by the
consent of the fighters, while lack of consent makes total war a hell.
Greek authors, on the other hand, are capable of describing horrors of total war,
while also praising war. Thucydides' description of the bloody revolution in Corcyra is
remarkable not only because of its resemblance to 20th century massacres, but also
because of his horror at the slaughter. In his writing, there is a sense that this war
violated the participants. Nonetheless, Thucydides was also capable of defending the
institution of war with concepts of time, hybris and other terms that are more at home in
discussions of creative warfare. This combination suggests to me that the line between
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creative war and total war was not clear in Ancient Greece. The lack of a clear
distinction is not surprising, as Walzer's binary between total war and creative war was
borne of the necessity to distinguish between the cruelties of World War II and the
violence between two Native American tribes who were more concerned with honor than
with victory.
Whether or not the Greeks had at some point a system of fighting that could be
considered purely creative war, we do not know. However, with the establishment of the
polis, battles began to take on more and more political significance. Nonetheless, time
remained essential to understanding why and how battles were fought on the battlefield
and how Greeks decided to fight. Herodotos and Thucydides would cite time in order to
understand the origins of war and were uncritical of the idea that battle was necessary to
improve the mettle of a man. For both Plato and Aristotle, training for war was essential
for leadership. In short, none of these thinkers could accept the proposition that war
should be avoided entirely, because war itself had some positive aspects, which could
include for training new leadership or for proving manliness. These positive aspects are
the remnants of the creative war tradition.
While the transition from creative warfare to total warfare had already begun with
the establishment of the polis, the fifth century would bring many pivotal changes to how
Greeks fought. I will show how the establishment of hoplite warfare, which began in the
Archaic age, while departing significantly from previous forms of warfare, nonetheless
had many vestiges of creative warfare. During the fifth century, hoplites began to lose
their prominence within Greek military, due, amongst other factors, to the rise of
importance of the navy. This shift away from hoplites also signaled that the stakes of war
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were raised, that winning by any means would became more important than winning with
honor. Previously, the hoplites had symbolized technological and organizational
innovation, and progress towards total war. After hoplites, the transition towards total
war symbolized by navies and lightly armed troops.
But while these authors were clearly influenced by the tradition of the hoplites
and Homeric warriors, I am not so crude to suggest that these thinkers are merely the
products of their times. There is no doubt that not only did they put their own stamp on
their work but that their thinking acquired historical significance. For example, Plato and
Aristotle argued that war should not be the telos of society, thereby critiquing the
militaristic societies of Sparta and Crete. However, Plato and Aristotle were writing after
a shift in Greek warfare. They knew from history that war could preserve Greek
independence but also destroy Greek unity.
The reason for expressing this continuum of creative war to total war is to provide
a context for Herodotos', Thucydides', Plato's and Aristotle's thoughts on war. There was
a conflicting tradition of war as both art, something to practised for its own sake, and as a
something that was merely a tool for domination. These writers were interested in many
aspects of war, including theorizing the origins of all wars, not just a specific war. They
also wrote about war in terms of right and wrong. But to reiterate one of the reasons for
writing this paper, the way in which they wrote about war in terms of right and wrong is
not explicit. Herodotos and Thucydides wrote much on war, but not on their conceptions
of justice. Aristotle and Plato wrote much on justice, but comparatively little about war.
Going in chronological order, I will start with Herodotos and end with Aristotle, who was
explicit, but brief, on the relationship between justice and war.
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As a historian, Herodotos was interested in the aitia of war, including the possible
heavenly or fate based origins of war. Thucydides is usually credited as being the first to
make a distinction between superficial and stated reasons for war, but Herodotos'
characters talk openly of how declaring war is good for their own interests but not for the
populacev. However, I see Herodotos presenting three different causes of war: Those
that the rulers tell their populace, those that they tell themselves and also fate itself.
As Herodotos was chronicling the Greeks repulsion the Persian invasion, he did
not elaborate much on the Greeks' decision to go to war. Defending one's soveriengty
through force was, and still is, considered an obvious response to invasion. However,
Herodotos did narrate the Persian kings' motives for invading Greece. These motives,
which Herodotos explicitly stated in the conversation between Darius and his wife
Atossa, are to distract the populace from local problems, unify the Persian empire, prove
Darius's manliness and gain timee through victory. I will analyze what these motives
mean in the context of a dialogue between Persian king and his wife, particularly how
they imply that Herodotos felt that the Persians' war was unjust.
Then I will examine the motives for the Greeks’ defense, for although it appears
that the decision to fight the Persians was an obvious response, the Greeks constantly
doubted their own cause. Herodotos was quite aware that war was hell as the former king
Croesus explains: "No one is fool enough to choose war instead of peace (Herodotos
1.87)." Nonetheless the Greeks choose a war with little probability of success rather than
to submit to the Persians. While Herodotos emphasizes the Greek love of eleutheria as
primary motive of their resistance, it is not the only one. It is clear that timee was a
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factor, as was fear and hatred of the Persians. While he thought that the Persians' war
was unjust, Herodotos thought that the Greeks’ war of defense was just.
Herodotos' fellow historian, Thucydides appears entirely unconcerned with
justice. He was quite explicit about what he considered the cause of the Peloponnesian
war: Sparta's fear of a stronger Athens. Thucydides disregarded the heavens and fate as
possible beginnings of war. Rather than look outwards, he looked inwards, finding war's
prophasis in human nature. In this way he seems to have turned Herodotos inside out:
the cause of war is not outside humanity, it is within humanity itself. The origins of war,
despite being rooted within humanity, could not be prevented or contained. War
remained as inevitable as it was when the gods controlled it. A human, for Thucydides,
was someone who acted primarily out of philotimee, fear and necessity. His hypothesis
seems to be that if these desires are taken into consideration and without moralizing, the
causes of human events can be properly explained.
So for Thucydides, the justifications for war are lies that politicians tell their
constituencies that play on their sense of honor, greed and fear. These justifications are
lies because the real prophasis for war has nothing to do with these factors. Rather, the
Peloponnesian War broke out because Athens and Sparta, by nature, wanted the power
that their enemy held. This complete separation of power and morality was most
explicitly stated by the Athenians in the Melian Dialogue.
This famous dialogue is often read as a statement of the rules of power that
Thucydides was presenting throughout his history. However, I want to problematize this
interpretation by emphasizing the context of the dialogue within Thucydides' opus. For
his text is not an entirely dispassionate and critical. The Peloponnesian War could be
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read as a tragedy, starring Athens. This polis exhibits hybris by listening to war
mongering demagogues rather than far-sighted Pericles; by choosing the adventurous
Sicilian expedition rather than a conservative defense of Attica. In this context, the
Melian dialogue is not the revelation of a horrible truth about humanity, but the
Athenians' inauthentic justification that deserves the reader’s contempt.
This reading explains the great lengths that the politicians went to avoid talking of
their military actions as the unprovoked aggressions that they are. For if the Melian
doctrine on human nature was correct, there would be no need for politicians to
equivocate in concerns of aggression. But the Greek leaders either said that the opponent
struck first, or they obfusicate the enemy's ability to do harm with their actually having
done harm, or the continuation of peace with servitude to a foreign sovereign. Because
of the obvious disparity between the leaders' words and their actions, Thucydides wanted
us to see them as hypocrites. Hypocrites either because war cannot be just, as it is simply
following the "rules of power" or because they are willfully ignoring a moral way to
conduct war. If we take Thucydides at his word, the Peloponnesian war was amoral. If
we judge the war according to the system of ethics that we can infer from his text, it was
unjust. In either situation, war and justice seem irreconcilable.
Plato would reunite war with justice through his psychology. He, like
Thucydides, saw human nature as the primary cause of war. But unlike Thucydides, he
argued that this aggressiveness, thumos, could be controlled, fostered and limited.
Limited because otherwise it would destroy the polis and fostered because without it the
polis will be conquered. Plato discusses the proper cultivation of thumos in both the
Statesman and the Republic. In the later, he elaborates what war would look like in a just
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polis: wars should not be fought against Greeks, should not motivated by desire for
material gain but instead should be used as an opportunity to train young guardians.
However, Plato did allow for wars to be fought to ensure that the polis has sufficient
resources for independent existence. War is primarily necessary to insure that the polis
remains independent, as it will be surrounded by unjust poleis. Additionally, war was
necessary for the proper education would lead to the correct balance of the soul, which is
the primary source of justice.
For all these reasons, war continued to have a place in the completely just society
in Plato's Republic. The Statesman and the Laws are both much more straightforward
than the Republic about the relationship of war and justice, but they also talk signficantly
less about war. Nonetheless, I will briefly examine both these other dialogues separately
of the Republic as Plato's works do not easily compliment each other and generally
demand to be considered in the context of the dialogue itself. However, these two
separate investigations provide further evidence that Plato considered the origin of war to
be the human soul and that any sort moral judgment of war requires the proper balancing
of the human psychee.
Aristotle turns away from the soul as the connection between war and justice and
turns towards the cosmos. For Aristotle viewed war as an activity, that if it is done for
the proper telos, would be in harmony with the universe. It is Aristotle's concern about
the telos of war that allowed him to begin to outline a system of ethics for total war.
Thucydides earlier had documented the Peloponnesian war as a total war, but had wanted
to avoid judging it ethically. As I said above, Thucydides nonetheless indirectly hinted at
a way to judge war through the hypocrisy of politicians and his horror at massacre.
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Aristotle in his Politics, on the other hand, stated explicitly that the proper telos of war
should be peace. He then used this explanation of the purpose of war to critique overtly
militaristic socities, like Sparta and Crete, and also to justify wars that either create or
defend just poleis.
Like Plato, Aristotle identified military training as essential to constructing proper
leadership. However, he was not so much interested in using it to properly balance the
soul or to train children. Rather, Aristotle saw war as necessary for establishing a proper
hierarchy. War should be used domestically to ensure that masters rule over slaves and
externally to ensure that Greeks are not dominated by barbarians. This proper hierarchy
is one of the requirements for Aristotle's just polis.
It becomes clearer that Aristotle is not the progenitor of Just War Theory when he
stated further that war can be fought for the acquisition of property. Since St. Augustine,
Just War Theory says that a just war can only be fought for defense. Declaring war in
order to obtain wealth and slaves, which Aristotle argued for, would be labled aggression.
Aggression was the charge that procured a guilty verdict against the defendants at
Nuremberg. The seriousness of that charge demonstrates the level of disconnect
between Aristotle's system of ethical war and contemporary thoughts on Just War
Theory.
Histories of Ancient Greece are often dominated by stories of war. While there is
no doubt that war played a crucial part in shaping antiquity, I do not want to declare it the
most important practice for understanding Ancient Greece. The Greeks honestly loved
peace and all the activities conducted during it. However, it also cannot be denied that
war was an integral part of their society. Despite the extensive importance of war to
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Greek life, I believe that my approach to examine this topic, looking at the discussion of
war and justice in four authors, will provide some new insight.

i

Walzer, Michael. Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical
Illustrations, Fourth Edition. Basic Books, New York NY, 2006. pg. 3
ii
Ruskin, John. The Crown of Wild Olive: Four Lectures on Industry and War.
Maynard, Mill and Co., New York NY, 1874. pg. 90-91.
iii
Walzer, pg. 25
iv
Walzer, pg. 24
v
Shipey, Graham. "The Limits of War" War and Society in the Greek World.
Routledge, New York NY, 1993. pg. 11
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Historical Context

War is not death to young men; war is life.
Look Homeward Angel, Thomas Wolfe
Ye shall love peace as a means to new warsand the short peace more than the long.
You I advise not to work, but to fight.
You I advise not to peace, but to victory.
Let your work be a fight, let your peace be a victory!
Thus Spake Zarathustra, Friedrich Nietzsche
In this chapter I will briefly examine the evolution of Greek warfare. Particularly,
I am interested in describing Greek warfare as a continuum from creative warfare to total
warfare. The distinction between creative warfare and total warfare is important to us in
this paper because of the very different ethical concerns that each raise. Creative warfare
has the consent of all its combatants and limits violence to the participating warriors.
The outcome of creative warfare also has little to no political significance, in the sense
that it does not affect the existence or freedom of a polis. Total warfare, on the other
hand, has limitless possibilities for violence against both soldiers and civilians. Total
warfare is primarily concerned with political concerns as the freedom and survival of a
political community is at stake. Ancient Greece never saw a period of pure creative
warfare or pure total war. But during the period from 700 BC to 338, there was a
transition towards total war; that is, a shift towards wars fought primarily for political
reasons. The Greeks never completed this transition to total war just as they never
practiced pure creative war. I will examine this transition by first looking at warfare prior
to 700 BC, what I will call Homeric warfare. The second period is 700-490 BC; the rise
of the hoplite. The remaining period, 490-338 BC, follows the decline of the hoplite and
the ascension of navies and numerous, lightly armed soldiers.
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Whether the Greeks at any point practiced 'pure' creative warfare sometime during
or before the Dark Age is uncertain. However, Homeric warriors fought for the explicit
purpose of looting and enslaving the opposing population, as seen in the Iliad and the
Odyssey. Unlike in pure creative warfare, these aristocratic warriors were as concerned
with honor as they were with material gain. That these men were aristocrats is important
to notice, as the identity of who fights in ancient Greece changes over time. The cost of
arms, armor, chariot and horse limited warfare to the wealthy few who could afford it.
The transition to hoplite warfare would not simply be an organizational or technological
change, those who in Greek society fought and why they fought would also change.
Victor Davis Hanson outlines four stages of hoplite warfarevi. The first, 700-490
BC is one in which border disputes are resolved through a single hoplite battle. In the
second, 490-431 BC, a variety of different troops fought in addition to hoplites on land
while naval battles became increasingly important. Also during this period, multiple
battles and military theatres replaced the single, agreed upon battles, which was the mode
of fighting during the Archaic age. During the third period, 431-404 BC, hoplites fought
and were honored but they were no longer prominent within the military. Lightly
armored troops increased in importance and sieges and sea battles were more significant
than a single watershed land battle. In the fourth period, 404-338, the position of hoplite
was no longer restricted to citizens and is opened to metics. The hoplite phalanx became
only a small part in a larger army. These numerous changes show us that there is no
identity to the hoplite that transcends history. To present a harmonious picture of this
heavy-infantry man and the phalanx, as Vidal-Naquet remarks, is to jumble over two
hundred years of historical evolutionvii.
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The history of the hoplite is a history of the transition away from the Homeric
warrior. The Homeric warrior was interested in individual glory and wealth. While the
hoplite, like his aristocratic forbearer, was also interested in material gain, he was
primarily motivated by the political safety of the polisviii. But the desire for timee was
just as real as the desire for wealth. Lendon notes that this thirst for glory and the desire
for revenge is hard for modern readers to understand. Modern readers often assume that
economic and political motivations take precedence, even if they are not explicitly
statedix. To take this interpretation is to completely disregard a Greek interpretation of
their own history and cultural practices.
Unfortunately, historical evidence for the Dark Ages is scarce and the Homeric
poems are the primary textual sources. These sources are incredibly problematic as it is
hard to discern what are descriptions of practices in the 8th century and what are
descriptions of older practices. However, these descriptions are important not only
because of their possible historical documentation, but because they influenced how all of
Greece viewed war and honor. It is quite likely that when Aristotle described cavalry as
being a tool of the aristocrats (Politics 1289b25) he was thinking of Patrocolos and
Achilles riding chariots on the fields of Troy.
Despite the prominence of honor in Homeric thought, we should not classify
Homeric warfare purely as creative warfare. For the Trojan War had devastating political
outcomes: The razing of Ilium and the enslavement or death of the much of the
population. We also must remember that the Greeks were not so honor-bound as to reject
using the Trojan Horse rather than continue open battle. But while the Greeks fought on
the Dardan shores for ten years, their dedication towards the common goal of capturing
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Helen seems lacking. They seem more concerned with dueling, scrambling for booty and
taking revenge. All of these acts are connected to the individual warrior's honor.
The Homeric warrior was not only fighting the enemy but also competing against
his comrades in a contest of obtaining honor, timeex. The warrior could obtain timee by
either performing an act of aretee, or taking booty or taking revenge on the enemy.
Aretee could be any commendable military action, such as the capture or slaying of an
important enemy. A prime example of aretee is when Diomedes, after having been
blessed by Athena, rampaged through the Trojan forces (Iliad, 5.1). But it was not
excellence alone that determined aretee. The action had to be seen by others, so that they
can know that it was he who had performed such a feat. Taking revenge, or timooria,
was another method of gaining honor. By shaming or defiling a corpse, a Homeric
warrior transferred the dead man's honor to himselfxi. Honor was a zero sum game: If
your enemy was shamed, then you gained honor. Therefore, the spoils of war were not
only valued for their economic benefit, but for the honor they would bring the holder.
For taking the enemy's arms, armor and wares increased the warrior's honor by shaming
the opponent and also giving the Homeric warrior the opportunity to dedicate the gifts to
the gods, thereby proving his excellence further.
With all this attention to how one fought and the process of gaining honor, the
warriors almost seem unconcerned with the outcome of the battle. For there can be no
doubt that the dueling and looting that occurred in the midst of battle distracted from
what modern readers would consider the primary point: winning the battle. But to take
this view is to attempt to analyze Homeric warfare only through the lens of total warfare.
Through these lenses, these actions seem both foolish and self-indulgent, given the high
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stakes of battle. Indeed, during the 5th century, the Greeks would agree. For example,
during the Battle of Marathon, the Greeks would not pause after battle to loot the Persian
corpses, but rather continued on to raze the ships and then march back to guard Athens
(Herodotos 6.115). The Spartans' refused to give Aristodemos the award of aristeia for
his bravery against the Persians because Aristodemos had broken rank with the phalanxxii.
All three of these actions, aretee, timooria and looting, revolved around the
Homeric warrior being noticed and applauded by the peers against whom he competed.
The hoplite was not in competition with his peers. The hoplite phalanx required the full
coordination and cooperation from each fighting man. The hoplite did not fight for
himself, but rather for the polis. But the transition in Greece from aristocratic warriors to
hoplite citizen-soldiers did not eliminate the importance of time, but rather changed the
conception of honor. The hoplite's honor was first to the polis rather to himself. This
shift in the conception of honor would mean war to be continued to be described in terms
of honor but also that warfare was now more political.
Kurt Raaflaub characterizes hoplite battles during the Archaic age as: "brief,
violent, almost ritualistic encounters of hoplite armiesxiii." The battles were brief, in
particular in comparison to modern warfare: "..If [we] were to total all the moments of
[an Ancient Greek] man's life- time in which he actually attacked an enemy with spear
and shield in the phalanx, it was surely an minuscule amount- sixty, three hundred, six
hundred minutes…xiv" Mardonios testified to Xerxes the full brutality of this method of
warfare:

…The Hellenes are in a habit of starting wars without the slightest
forethought, out of obstinacy and stupidity. For whenever they declare
war with one another, they seek out the finest and most level land and go
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there and to fight, so that the victors depart from the field only after great
damage has been done and I won't say anything at all of the defeated, for
they are completely destroyed. (Herodotos 7.9b)
In addition to demonstrating a sense of Greek pride in the combination of brevity and
brutality, this passage also indicated the ritualistic quality in hoplite warfare: that the two
opposing forces agreed upon the time and place of battle. This agreement was necessary
as the large and cumbersome phalanx is not suited to rocky Greece. In G.B. Grundy's
words: "The typical Greek army was composed of a type of force which could not
possibly have been effective in four-fifths of the area of the country."xv That the
beginning of hoplite battles were determined by agreement demonstrates to us that
hoplite battle retained creative war aspects despite an important transition towards total
war.
Another ritualistic quality of hoplite warfare was the self-imposed limitation on
its use. During the Archaic age hoplite battles were almost exclusively fought over
territorial disputes. Raaflaub notes that before the Persian War, poleis were not
particularly interested in either conquering other cities or destroying themxvi. Indeed, the
only major military expansion during this period, Sparta's invasion of Messenia, resulted
in such drastic changes to Spartan life that it probably did not inspire other poleis to do
the same. Rather, poleis sought to expand their influence through hegemonic leadership
in alliances and expansion of conquered landxvii. These limitations on both the purpose
and extent of warfare would change after the Archaic age as Greek warfare continued to
shift towards total war.
Hoplite warfare followed strict conventions and in many ways the fighting was as
regulated as the justifications of war. The battle was fought on agreed upon ground, at an
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agreed upon time and would last only a couple hours at most. The battle was fought
between opponents who had agreed upon the proper weapons: Swords and spears.
Polybios articulated the war conventions during this period: Fraud and deception were
discouraged, as were missiles, both unseen and long distancedxviii. Hand-to-hand combat
was consider the best as, it "gave clear resultsxix." These conventions were a combination
of religious doctrines and inter-poleis treaties. Herodotos wrote how the Spartans were
late to Marathon because they had to observe the festival of Karneia (Herodotos 6.106).
The geographer Strabo mentions that in his wanderings, he came across an inscribed
pillar forbidding the use of missiles during battles on the Lelantine Plainxx.
In addition to being closely regulated by convention, hoplites came from a
specific economic and political background. While the word hoplites simply means one
who carries a hoplon shield, the name had both class and political connotations. Hoplites
were so closely identified with their armor and spears, that Aristotle defined a middle
class man as one who could afford hoplite arms and armor (Politics, 4.13). We should
consider this description while remembering the aristocratic Homeric warrior. The rise
of the hoplites meant that the aristocrats no longer had a monopoly on war as they had
had during Homeric warfare and that from the Archaic age onwards, the middle class was
involved in battle. The other particular distinction of hoplite battle was that it was
primarily fought by citizen soldiers, most of whom were farmers. Sparta stood out as an
obvious exception, with their entire class of homoioi dedicated to war and the preparation
for war. But for most poleis, the hoplite was a citizen soldier who had little to no
training. Hanson notes that not only did Greek farmers have little time to drillxxi, but also
that hoplite weaponry was so easy to master that training was not necessaryxxii. The idea
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of a hoplite as a part-time, middle class soldier can only be a description of the hoplite
during the Archaic age. In the 5th century, the role of the hoplite changed.
After the Persian wars, not only were more and more of the working classes
involved in war, but the role of the soldier became specialized. Working-class men
would rowed on Greek triremes or fought on land as lightly armored troops. Warfare
expanded in other ways as well: Wars lasted longer and involved multiple armies rather
simply being a fight between neighboring poleis. The Persian War and its aftermath
completely changed Greek warfare. This war was against a common Greek enemy,
which necessitated the creation of trans-poleis alliances, which had the purpose not of
settling disputes, but for preserving Greek independence. Additionally, the Persians did
not follow the same war conventions as the Greeks. They did not have a disdain for
missiles or a preference for hoplite warfare. However, the Greeks' war traditions did not
hinder them in battle. Afterwards the battles of Thermopylae and Marathon were hailed
in Greek tradition as proof the Greeks' superior courage and military prowess.
The Persian war further shifted Greek wars towards total war, as the political
independence of the Greek poleis was at stake. Despite the high stakes, many war
conventions from the Archaic Age continued, such as the awarding of aristeria, the
collecting of the dead and the collection of the booty. Herodotos recorded that aristeria,
the process of awarding the man who fought the best that day, as happening not only after
the land battles, but also naval battles (Herodotos 8.17). Another Homeric war
convention that continued into the Persian war was concern over the dead. The proper
treatment of the dead remained a high priority even during this war, as can be seen when
the Spartans fought fiercely for the body of Leonidas during the battle of Thermopylae
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(Herodotos 7.225). Gathering booty at the end of a battle remained important, as it was
during Homeric warfare, but as Garlan notes, spoils were now the property of the polis
rather than the individualxxiii.
Despite these continuities from Archaic hoplite warfare, the Persian war marked
many changes in the manner that Greeks fought. Perhaps the greatest change was the
increased importance of navies. While triremes were for the most part supplements to
land forces, as both the Greek and Persian navies stayed close to the coast, Greece's
freedom was determined by naval battles and naval misfortunes. The most obvious
example is the battle of Salamis, after which Xerxes had to begin to withdraw his forces
back to Persia. Earlier, the Greeks had gained a reprieve when Mardonios' ships were
destroyed by a storm near Mt. Athos (Herodotos 6.44). Furthermore, navies changed the
Greek warfare by changing the demographics of Greek battle and changing the
importance of courage. For the navies were rowed by working class citizens, metics and
slaves. Naval battles also relied more directly on technology and tactics and less directly
on the courage that the Greeks valued so highly in hoplite warfare.
The other major changes to Greek warfare during the Persian war included the
introduction of large coalitions of poleis and the extended duration of war. Hanson notes
that during the Archaic period there were well over one thousand autonomous poleis all
within 50,000 square milesxxiv and that the primary cause of battle between them was
border disputes. The battles to settle these disputes were incredibly violent, but also
short. It usually consisted of a single combat which lasted at most a few hours. While
the Persian invasions of 490 and 480 were two different and distinct events, themselves
lasting only a campaign season, it was understood that they were part of a continuous
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assault upon the independent Greek poleisxxv. These poleis allied together and in doing
so began a trend that would dominate the next major war between Athens and Sparta.
All these trends that we saw begin in the Persian war, the use of navies, the
increased participation of working classes in warfare, the increased duration of warfare,
the importance of trans-poleis alliances, continued during the Peloponnesian War. All of
these factors indicate both a decrease of the importance of the hoplite in Greek warfare
and also a further transition away from creative warfare and towards war primarily
motivated by politics rather than by honor.
The name of the Peloponnesian war is itself an indicator the importance of poleis
alliances: The war was between the coalition lead by Athens, consisting of the Delian
League and other poleis, and the Peloponnesian League lead by Sparta. These coalitions
had arisen out of the Persian war. Athens' hegenomia would not have been possible
without the navy that had been initially created to fight the Persians. Sparta's position as
leader of the Peloponnesian League was in part a result of their manipulation of the
reputation that they had gained during the Persian War. Sparta's rallying cry against
Athens during the Peloponnesian War was that Athens, like Persia before, was trying to
enslave all of Greece (Thucydides 1.124). In announcing themselves the defender of
Greek eleutheria, the Spartans were building upon their reputations they gained at
Thermopylae and other battles during the Persian war.
Given the presence of these trans-poleis alliances, it should not be a surprise that
war was now a much longer affair as war was no longer a matter of border disputes.
Rather the origins of war consisted of the political concerns of poleis, often framed in
terms of honor. But the increased size and complexity of Greek forces were not the only
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factors for the extension of warfare. The use of sieges marked a shift away from the
ritualistic brevity of hoplite battles. Hanson remarks that the relationship between the
polis and hoplite battle in the Archaic age had been particularly distancedxxvi. But my
emphasis on siege warfare during the Peloponnesian War should not suggest that there
were no sieges prior to this war. For example, during the Persian war, the Athenians had
had to flee their home in order to escape the Persians. However, during the
Peloponnesian war, siege warfare had became such a standard practice such that it
demanded constant consideration. For example, naval sieges were the Athenians'
primary tool for ensuring control over the Delian League. However, the Athenians did
not have a monopoly on this tactic: The Spartan king Archidamos besieged Athens at the
outbreak of hostilities. Pericles' response to this siege was to abandon the farmlands and
to put all trust in the Athenian navy (Thucydides, 2.55). The Periclean strategy was a
complete rejection of the hoplite tradition of short, intense battles as he advocated for a
soldier-less defense of Athens.
Warfare during the Peloponnesian war furthered de-centered the hoplite not only
by taking war to the sea but also by taking it to the working classes. Greek triremes
required many rowers. The ranks of the middle class and the upper class were not able to
furnish all the bodies necessary for rowing, even if it had been considered honorable.
Additionally, working class and metics began to take up arms in the infantry. Rather than
cladding themselves in heavy hoplite armor, they instead took up slings, light spears and
light armor (Thucydides, 5.6). After the Peloponnesian war, the hoplite still remained in
the Greek army. But rather than being the force around which the entire military
revolved, he was one type of soldier among many.
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After the Peloponnesian war, the fifth century saw a decline of the hoplite and the
citizen soldier. The Greeks were aware of the decline of the citizen hoplite and spoke out
against itxxvii. Demosthenes lamented the loss of the hoplite tradition and lambasted the
rise of mercenariesxxviii and Isocrates complained of the presence of metics within the
remaining the hoplite phalanxesxxix. The increased use of mercenaries occurred at the
same time that military tactics were becoming more complicated, thus favoring
professional soldiers over citizen soldiersxxx. This professionalization of hoplites
occurred while the military prowess of hoplites was becoming doubtful. Diodoros told
how the Athenian Iphicreates thoroughly destroyed a phalanx of 600 Spartan hoplites
with a troop of peltastsxxxi. During the Corinthian War and the numerous hostilities
during the 5th century, the hoplite was a marginal figure in the military.
While the Persian and Peloponnesian wars would suggest that Greece had fully
transitioned to total war, as the survival, rather than the honor of the polis was at stake,
we need to remember that these wars were always framed in terms of honor. The Greeks
had an opportunity to avoid war with the Persians: they could have submitted as many
other poleis did. Those who did not called upon their citizens to resist based on the honor
of being a free polis. Likewise, while Thucydides would have his audience believe that
the only cause of the Peloponnesian war was Sparta's fear of Athens' growing power, the
politicians in his history constantly frame aggression and defense as a matter of honor.
The Greeks never completed the transition to total warfare, just as they never practiced
pure creative warfare. These concepts, nonetheless, remain essential for understanding
the evolution of Greek military history.
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We must keep in mind the changing nature of Greek warfare when we consider
the way Herodotos, Thucydides, Plato and Aristotle commented on war and how justice
related to war. They commented on war at different points during history, and therefore
their points of reference were different. But the necessity of contextualizing their works
is not the only reason that we must keep in mind the history of Greek warfare. For by
looking at the history of Greek warfare in terms of creative and total war, we can see that
these Greek writers had two ways to look at war: One through the lens of creative war
and another through the lens of total war. These two different thoughts on war can
explain why Herodotos wrote that "No one is fool enough to choose war instead of
peace" (Herodotos 1.87) but also praised Leonidas for choosing to die fighting, even
though Leonidas knew that he will loose Thermopylae to the Persians (Herodotos 7.220).
vi
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…quamquam et apud Herodotum patrem historiae
et apud Theopompum sunt innumerabiles fabulae.
Cicero, De Legibus, 1.5

Herodotos, the father of lies and history, was interested in many aspects of the
Persian War: its beginning, the motivations of both the Greeks and Persians and much
more. While Herodotos did not explicitly say what he considered made a war just or
unjust, by examining how he describes the origins of the Persians' wars of conquest, I
will argue that Herodotos considered wars of conquest unjust and wars of defense just.
The reason for this difference between the wars has to do with Herodotos' cosmology.
For Herodotos described the Persians' expansionist wars as failing in some way because
they were wars of expansion. Because these political wars were the object of his
Histories, we know that Herodotos had some understanding of total war. But the way
that Herodotos described honorable actions suggests that he continued to look at war
through the lens of creative warfare. Total war, and also improper gender roles, for
Herodotos, were imbalances of the cosmic order.
Herodotos differs from the other writers I will examine because he believed that
the Greek gods or fate must be credited as the first cause of all major events. Because of
his belief in divine oversight, Herodotos believed that the unjust would be punished. The
stories that Herodotos told about Persian wars suggest that he felt that wars for the sake
of conquest were unjust and contrary to the nature of the cosmos. My reasoning behind
this logic is not so much Herodotos' sympathy for those that the Persians attack, but that
he always described the Persians' works of conquests failing in some way. As a follower
of the Greek gods, Herodotos believed that the cosmos had a balance of justice. Fate
would ensure that justice would be restored if the balance had been disrupted.
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Herodotos' thoughts on war took place not only in the context of Greek theology
and cosmology but also in the historical shift away from creative warfare and towards
total warfare. For while Herodotos chronicled wars that ultimately destroyed or enslaved
entire populations, these wars were often initiated to gather honor or to assert masculinity
(3.120.3). Unjust wars were presented as a matter of hubris; of reaching for something
that is not proper for mortals. Injustice as hubris differs from the common, contemporary
conception of injustice as a violation. But Herodotos' conception of injustice was
different and his characters talk of war primarily in terms of honor and manhood. In
addition to warfare being framed in terms of honor, Herodotos also wrote of Greek war as
ritualized, which is to say that certain war conventions were followed despite now
obstructing victory. This ritualized element was more closely associated with creative
warfare than with total warfare, suggesting that while a transition towards total war had
begun, it was not complete.
In addition to total war, for Herodotos improper gender roles disrupted the natural
balance of the cosmos. The Greeks, unlike the Persians and all other peoples that
Herodotos mentioned, were neither unconfident in their masculinity nor hypermasculinized. While Persian leaders declared war in order to prove their manliness to
others, Greek leaders, confident in their virtuous position, could choose not to wage war.
Persian leaders needed to prove their masculinity because of the expectations of their
subjects and also the threatening nature of their enemy’s gender. For the Persian enemies
included queens and hyper-masculine kings who challenged the manliness of Persian
leaders. The origins of war for Herodotos have to be understood in terms of gender as
well as honor.
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Herodotos began his work with a search for the aitia of the great war that he
hoped to chronicle. This search quickly became a combination of politics and myth with
an adaptation of the Trojan War that linked the abduction of Helen with the story of Io
and Medea (1.3). After finishing this account, Herodotos wrote that this is the story that
the Phoenicians and Persians told, but that he will offer a Greek account. However, in
the middle of this Asiatic account, Herodotos interrupted himself and wrote, "Now the
Persians think that the abduction of women is certainly an act only unjust men would
perform, and yet once they have been abducted, it is senseless to make a fuss over
it."(1.4) By chastising the Greeks for beginning the Trojan War over the kidnapping of a
woman, he implied that kidnapping does not justify going war. This judgment implies
that for Herodotos there was a rubric for judging the justifications for war and that Trojan
War had failed it.
Herodotos' story of Croesos shortly follows that passage on the Trojan war.
Herodotos noted that "Croesos was the first barbarian to known to us who subjugated and
demanded tribute from some of the Greeks (1.6)" unlike the Cimmerians, who had
invaded earlier, but had not subjugated Greek cities like Croesos had (1.6.2). This
contrast suggests to us that for Herodotos there was a difference between a war for loot
and a war for political dominance. From the context of the passage, for Croesos' actions
were supposed to be the beginning of a Greek account for the Persian War, Herodotos
implies that war for subjugation is worse, that is, more unjust than wars for loot.
Later, when Cyrus defeated Croesos, Herodotos gave a different interpretation of
war. After Cyrus spared Croesos' life, Croesos exclaimed: "No one is fool enough to
choose war instead of peace-in peace sons bury their fathers, but in war fathers bury sons.
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It must have been heaven's will that this should happen (1.87)." This quote is a
condemnation of all total wars. It does not condemn the creative wars that I have
previously described because of Croesos' emphasis that war is the opposite of peace.
Creative wars were seen as part of the natural order of life due to their ritualistic
importance. Indeed, in societies that practice creative wars, if there was no war, many
men would be genuinely unhappy. But Croesos described war as a complete inversion of
everyday life: "in peace sons bury their fathers, but in war fathers bury sons." War's
disruption of the balance of human life is so morally repugnant that Croesos declared that
no rational man would choose it. Yet war exists, and is started by rational men like
Croesos.
In his quote Croesos deftly escaped condemning his own actions (such as
declaring war against Cyrus) by declaring that he was manipulated by fate like some
tragic hero. Indeed, Croesos' story is very similar to that of a tragic hero: He
misinterpreted the Delphic oracle concerning his victory because of hubris and was then
punished accordingly. This narrative implies the futility of human knowledge,
suggesting that forces beyond human comprehension influence the machinations of the
human affairs. Yet after hearing Croesos's tale, Cyrus took him on as an advisor (1.88).
By employing Croesos, Cyrus began the cycle of war again.
Let us return to the idea that the cause of war is outside human control. For
modern readers, to argue that something is outside human control is to imply that that
action should not be judged ethically. For it is reasonable to assume that only human
actions can be judged ethically. Therefore, any sort of moral investigation of war implies
that certain decisions about war are within human control. Croesos did not deny that war
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is horrible; indeed, it is the least desirable of human conditions. But for him it is not
possible for humans to prevent war, since war is determined by the divine and humans
simply obey its dictates.
But we should not assume that because Herodotos thought war was inevitable that
it could not be judged ethically. For Herodotos was writing in a fatalistic literary
tradition. In Greek tragedies and epics, humans were ultimately not in control of their
own destines, as that was controlled by fate and by the gods. However, this lack of
control did not absolve humans from the duty to be good. For example, Oedipos did not
try to excuse his crimes by blaming fate. Rather, he recognized that he has done wrong
and that he should suffer for it. Despite the interference of both the gods and destiny,
humans were still expected to be just. Therefore, Herodotos could be a fatalist and also
have criteria for what is a just or an unjust war.
Herodotos' condemnation of wars of conquest can be seen as a judgment of total
war practices through the lens of creative war, with which he was more familiar. His
chronicle of Median and Persian kings provides ample evidence of what he considered
unjust and unjustified wars. These stories all implicitly conclude that Herodotos
considered wars that had the telos of conquest were unjust. We could see this as a
prototype of one of the fundamental ideas of Just War Theory: Wars of aggression are
always unjust. This position is not surprising, for the Persian War was an important
turning point for Greek warfare. During the Archaic Age, wars were primarily fought
over land disputes and were not fought as a means of conquest. Therefore, we can
understand Herodotos as reacting against the shift in Greek warfare towards total war and
away from creative war.
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Herodotos' stories on wars of conquest included the story of Darius' and Cyrus'
rise to power. These kings initiated numerous wars with the purpose of conquering other
people. Both Cyrus and Darius stood in contrast to both the Athenians and the Spartans,
who were not described as expansionists. Such a contrast in the military purpose of those
whom Herodotos supports, the Greeks, and those he does not, the Persians, makes it easy
to read the Persians as bad because they are expansionists.
Cyrus was cast as an expansionist by nature when he attacked the Massagetae.
Herodotos mentioned that there were many factors that inspired his ambition, but that the
two primary ones were his belief in his superhuman origins and the success of his
previous military campaigns (1.204). Those two reasons are not explanations for why
Cyrus would want to attack the Massagetae; rather, they are reasons why Cyrus would
feel confident that his attack would succeed. Herodotos did not make Cyrus' motives
explicit and thereby naturalizes them. To naturalize these motives is to say that
Herodotos made his readers assume that it is obvious that Cyrus would wish to go to war
for the sake of conquest.
The Massagetae queen Tomyris understood that Cyrus desired her land and her
sovereignty. Therefore she rejected Cyrus's offer of marriage (1.205). When Cyrus then
had his forces move to the edge of her border, she sent him a message:
I advise you to abandon this enterprise, for you cannot know if in the end
it will do you any good. Rule your own people, and try to bear the sight of
me ruling mine. But of course you will refuse my advice, as the last thing
you wish for is to live in peace. (1.206)
Tomyris' words reinforce the idea that Cyrus is by nature a conquest driven man, as he
"will of course" dismiss this advice and does not desire to "live in peace." Tomyris told
Cyrus that his desires are not only unjust, but may ultimately cause him harm. She
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reasserted her right to her sovereignty of Massagetae while acknowledging that he has a
right to his own territory. Cyrus' expansion disrupted this just balance of political power
and it will bring Cyrus to a bad end, as he "cannot know if in the end it will do [him] any
good." This passage not only reinforces Croesus's statement about the limited nature of
human knowledge, it also argues that wars of conquest are against the just balance of the
cosmos. But the cosmos balances itself, returning itself to justice: Cyrus, like Croesos,
was punished for his war of conquest. In his account, Herodotos has the Massagetai kill
Cyrus and then Tomyris herself took revenge upon his corpse by thrusting his head into a
wineskin filled with human blood (1.214.4).
Herodotos repeated this moral with Cyrus' son, Cambyses. After conquering
Egypt, Cambyses sets his sights on the land of the legendary Ethiopians. But the
Ethiopian king immediately recognized Cambyses' agents as spies when they entered his
court. He told them:
…That king of yours is unjust. Had he any respect for what is right, he
would not have coveted any other kingdom than his own, nor made slaves
of a people who did him no wrong.(3.21)
Cambyses, like his father, did not head this warning. But although Cambyses attempted
to make war against the Ethiopians, his armies never arrived at to their land (3.25).
The Ethiopian king, like Tomyris, had seen through the pretext of friendliness.
They both rebuked the king for desiring more than what is due to him, of seeking an
unreasonable desire: To dominate the people of another kingdom. To pursue this desire
of conquest is to disrupt a just and natural order, just as the war that Croesos described
disrupted the natural life cycle of fathers and sons. In both of these cases, the desire to go
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to war was based on the desire for domination of more people and more territory.
Herodotos further chronicled the Persians as seeking war for even more unjust reasons.
Cambyses had a satrap in Sardis named Oroites. Herodotos wrote that Oroites
was determined to kill a certain Greek, Polycrates of Samos (3.120.1). Herodotos
acknowledged that he did not know for certain why Oroites desired to kill Polycrates, as
there are conflicting stories. The first explanation is that Oroites was quarreling with
another Persian, Mitrobates, over whom was the better man (3.120.2). Enraged,
Mitrobates said:
Do you actually consider yourself a man? You who failed to add the
island of Samos to the King's realm, although it lies adjacent to your
province and is so very easy to subdue that one of its natives, who now
rules it as a tyrant, revolted and took it with only fifteen hoplites?
(3.120.3)
Previously Tomyris had naturalized Cyrus' desire of conquest by dismissing any claim
that he might actually heed her advice. In this passage Mitrobates argues that Oroites
would be expected as a man to expand his king's domain. According to Mitrobates, any
real man would immediately seize the opportunity to crush a weak, neighboring
sovereignty to further the glory of his king. Ultimately, Oroites did kill Polycrates and
invaded Samos (3.121). Oroites, just like Cyrus and Cambyses, got his comeuppance.
After Darius assumed the throne, one of his first acts was to have Oroites killed for
authorizing the murder of Polycrates and the invasion of Samos (3.128). The cosmos has
returned to the state of justice by punishing the unjust man whose appetites had disrupted
the cosmic balance in the first place.
Later in his reign, Darius decided to go to war with the Scythians and was
persuaded by his wife to also make war with the Greeks. Atossa, Darius's wife, had
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concealed an unnamed illness of hers out of shame. Eventually she turned to the famous
doctor Democedes for a cure. Democedes promises her health in exchange for
persuading her husband to invade Greece (3.133). Herodotos wrote that she said the
following to Darius:
Sire, although you posses such great power, you are doing nothing to
acquire new nations or additional power for Persia. It is reasonable to
expect that a man who is young and the master of great wealth will display
his power openly so that the Persians will know they are being ruled by a
real man. There are actually two reasons why you should do this: not only
so that the Persians realize their leader is a man, but also to keep them so
occupied in war that they have no leisure to conspire against you. For
now is the time, while you are young, that you can achieve something,
since as the body grows, so does the mind, but as it ages, the mind ages
too and thus looses its edge (3.134).
As with Oroites, Darius is expected to desire to conquer because of his gender and
because of his position as a Persian leader. But in addition to naturalizing this desire, as
Tomyris, the Ethiopian King and Mitrobates had, Atossa argued that this desire for
conquest has many benefits. The desire for conquest was so naturalized in the position of
a Persian leader that Persian subjects expected and demanded it. They would have
thought less of a leader who did not seek to expand the empire. Atossa argued that
Darius would be fulfilling a natural balance if he did seek war. He would have used his
power as a leader and as a young man. Such use of power would be rewarded by nature
through increased strength in mind and body. Such a pursuit of power would be
rewarded by slavish obedience of the Persian populace. Atossa persuaded Darius that
wars of conquest are natural and just and Darius agreed with her (3.134.4).
But when Darius invaded the Scythians, he could not conquer them. Herodotos
explained that the Scythians were not sedentary people and were such expert horse riders
and that the Persian army could not effectively fight against them (4.46). Eventually the
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Persians are forced to retreat, having been out maneuvered and by the Scythians. The
cosmic order reasserts itself by giving victory to the Scythians, despite the small size of
their forces in comparison to the Persian army.
Let us return to the Persians' justifications for this war. While Atossa had
succeeded in persuading her husband to go to war, she particularly wanted Darius to
conquer the Greeks:
In my opinion, you should lead an army first against Greece. For I have
heard accounts of that land and have set my heart on obtaining Laconian
women to wait on me as servants, and I would also like to have Argive,
Athenian and Corinthian women, too. (3.134.5)
Herodotos explained that Darius's invasion of Greece had been to satisfy the whims of his
manipulative and conniving wife. By positioning this as a cause of Darius' invasion,
Herodotos was able to condemn the Persian attack without analyzing possible Greek
causes of the invasion. Such a description of the beginning of a war is shameful for the
Persians as the primary instigator is a woman who wants to satisfy her base desires. Of
course, within Herodotos' cosmology, this conspiracy between Atossa and Democedes is
not the true aitia of the Persian war, as that had been decided by fate much earlier.
Despite Darius being powerless before fate, Herodotos would have considered Darius
unjust in his pursuit of war against both the Scythians and the Greeks.
Let us contrast how Herodotos portrayed the Persian preperation for war to that of
the Greeks. Aristogoras of Miletus came to Sparta to convince the Lakedaemonians to
invade Persia in what would later become the Ionian revolt. Herodotos had Aristogoras
list various arguments for why King Kleomenes should support him. He claimed that the
Ionians have become douloi under the Persians and that this position is shameful not only
for themselves but also for the rest of Greece (5.49.2). The rest of his argument primarily
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consisted of elaborations of how the Persians were wealthy but also weak in battle.
Aristagoras noted that they "fight in trousers and turbans," proof of their military
inferiority to the Greeks (5.49.3). But Kleomenes was not convinced. He asked for two
days to ruminate on the subject. When they next meet, Aristagoras mentioned that his
proposed expedition would take the Spartans on a three-month journey away from the
sea. Upon hearing how much time would spent away from Sparta, Kleomenes refused
Aristagoras' offer (5.50). Despite the initial rejection, Aristagoras pursued the king again.
Kleomenes listened to Aristagoras' further arguments in the presence of his daughter,
Gorgo (5.51). Eventually, Aristagoras attempted to bribe the Spartan; offering him as
much as 50 talents for military aid (5.51). But Kleomenes instead listened to his
daughter, who said "Father, you had better go away, or the stranger will corrupt you
(5.51)." So he did, leaving Aristagoras alone in the throne room.
Kleomenes did not explicitly explain why it was not possible for the Spartans to
be so far from their polis, but he does stand on a long Spartan tradition of keeping foreign
military expeditions to a minimum. This conservative, rather than expansionist, foreign
policy stands in marked contrast to the Persians, who consider expansion to be a
necessity of their empire. Additionally, Kleomenes displayed himself as a man in control
of both his appetites and the desires of the Spartan nation, unlike the Persians and their
leaders. Kleomenes, unlike any of the Persian rulers, resisted the temptation of conquest.
Aristagoras' plan for conquest is presented as a temptation, a desire of the lower
appetites, as he tempted Kleomenes with possible spoils and then outright bribery from
his own coffers. But Kleomenes knew the importance of balance. To pursue the base
desire of conquest would disrupt the just balance that rules the cosmos, which Darius and
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other Persians had done. Kleomenes put the maintenance of this balance above the
potential gain of great wealth and political power. To have Sparta remain just, he
removed himself from the tempter Aristagoras.
The contrast between Darius's insatiable appetite and Kleomenes controlled
appetite is not the only juxtaposition between these two passages. Darius followed
Atossa's advice while Kleomenes followed that of Gorgo. Atossa, encouraging her
husband towards conquest, was a secretive woman who used her husband's political
powers for her own ends, both to get Democedes' medical assistance and to get more
slaves. Gorgo, on the other hand, was an innocent child who did not care about her own
desires and instead wants to see her father remain true to his Spartan honor. So while
Gorgo completely aligned her interest with her father and her polis, Atossa had her own
interests and no particular loyalty to the Persian empire.
In addition to their differing interests, Gorgo and Atossa also had differing
degrees of power. Atossa was able to manipulate Darius into following her desires by
persuading him with words and presumably (though not mentioned explicitly) her
sexuality. While Kleomenes did follow Gorgo's advice, it was not because she held any
power over him, but rather because she spoke as his conscience. Gorgo encouraged
Kleomenes to do what he already knew what was right.
This gender analysis of power relates back to the idea of balance and therefore
justice. Let us re-examine the previous examples. Cyrus fought Tomyris, a foreign
queen and Cambyses attempted to fight the hyper-masculinized Ethiopians, who were so
strong that they gave Camyses' messenger a bow no Persian could bend.(3.21.3)
Oroites initiated a war in order to prove his masculinity to Mitrobates. Herodotos
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considered these acts to be improper displays of gender, as the Persian men are
attempting to prove their masculinity. The proper gender relationship is displayed with
the Spartans: The man is the unquestioned ruler and father and the woman not actually
woman but a de-sexualized child who has the honor and interest of her father in mind.
Herodotos applauded Kleomenes' authority self-restraint, and noted that it was absent
when Aristagoras went to ask for help from Athens.
After leaving Sparta, Aristagoras went to Athens and persuaded them to send
twenty ships to support the Ionian revolt (5.97). Aristagoras again mentioned the Persian
riches and their military inferiority, in a way reminiscent of how Mitrobates described the
military inferiority of Samos to Oroites. Aristagoras also justified the war to the
Athenians by emphasizing the common heritage of the Athenians and the Ionians.
Herodotos did not say if any particular argument justified going to war for the Athenians,
simply noting that "it would seem to be easier to deceive and impose upon a whole
number of people than to do so to just one individual (5.97.2)." Later, he mentioned that
the armada that arrived to aid Aristagoras also contains five triremes from Eretria.
Ereteria had fought alongside the Milesians because the Milesians had aided them in a
war against the Cholcidians (5.99.1). While Herodotos noted that the Athenian
expedition to Ionia, "was the beginning of evils for both the Greeks and barbarians,
"(5.97.3) nothing in the passages suggests that he thought this intervention was unjust,
even if the Athenians were partially lured by the promise of Persian gold. Rather, the
Greeks seem to be "helping their friends and harming their enemies (Republic 334b)",
which Herodotos considered just. But to help one's friends and to harm one's enemies
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were not the only just reaons for war. For what is just in war, for Herodotos, depends
greatly on matters of honor.
Herodotos not only had his characters talk about initiating wars over honor, he
noted that wars were fought according to certain codes of honor. Here it is worth
remembering that Herodotos was describing a time period which shifted away from the
honor-bound territorial disputes of the Archaic age to wars fought for more political
reasons. While the Greeks fought the Persians over reasons of political independence,
they fought them using the same honor-bound method in which they had fought the
Archaic battles. Herodotos noted that the Spartan commander Amompharetos refused an
order to deploy from king Pausanias on the grounds that it was dishonorable (9.53).
Previously the Spartans had delayed themselves from arriving at Marathon because they
had to observe the holy month of Karneia (7.206). Leonidas' decision to stay and fight at
Thermopylae was described in terms of honor: He wanted a chance at everlasting glory
and hoped through this sacrifice that the prosperity of Sparta would not be obliterated
(7.220). During the battle of Thermopylae, the Spartan soldiers fought to claim Leonidas'
body in a way that mirrored Homeric battles over corpses (7.225). While Herodotos
mentioned night attacks (5.121) and surprise attacks (6.78), he also has Mardonios
describe Greek warfare to Xerxes as a ritualistic, although exceedingly brutal, affair
(7.9)xxxii. The importance of fighting a war in a honorable way for Herodotos should
suggest to us that he would not have considered just any war that had been begun for
dishonorable reasons.
Herodotos' history examined war and warfare from many different view points
and also different levels. On the one hand, in his cosmology and theology, Herodotos
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saw war as simply another event outside human control and governed by fate. But
despite the origins of war being outside human control, Herodotos nonetheless judged
some wars as having just causes and others having unjust causes. Rulers who fought
wars conducted with the intent of conquest or the enslavement of another nation or
ethnicity were condemned as being contrary to the natural balance of the cosmos. The
cosmos would return itself to its just state by punishing these actors for their hubris:
They would either die or their wars would fail and they would end up worse than before.
The Greeks, who fought instead for the sake of honor and kinship, did not disrupt
this cosmic balance. Additionally, the Greeks, unlike the Persians, followed what
Herodotos considered to be proper gender roles. While Herodotos portrayed the Persians
as initiating wars either to due to scheming women or men attempting to prove their
masculinity, Herodotos described the Greek men as having the power and authority
proper for them and therefore did not need to fight to establish either. Greek men were
also concerned with honor, even when fighting a war that would determine the political
sovereignty of their respective poleis. In the next chapter, Thucydides will disagree with
Herodotos on the importance of honor, arguing that wars originated from a system of
power. However, Thucydides' system of power was as beyond the control of humans as
Herodotos' fate. Both historians, while lamenting the horrors of war, did not see any way
of preventing war.
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mooros de thneetoon hostis ekporthei poleis
naous te tumbous th' hiera toon kekmykotoon,
ereemia dous autous ooleth' husteron.
The Trojan Women, 95

Like Herodotos, Thucydides was concerned with how war began. However, he
appears to have replaced Herodotos' fate and just cosmos with a system of power. His
introduction and the Melian dialogues are showcased as the sketches of an ideology of
power. In this interpretation, power is a system that operates outside the bounds of
human custom and morality. Like Herodotos' fate, this system of power cannot be
altered consciously by humans. This is to say that Thucydides and Herodotos found the
cause of war to be beyond human control, as the later found the primary cause with the
divine and the former found it as an unalterable part of human nature. But while
Herodotos nonetheless had an ethical framework, despite being a fatalist, Thucydides
stated that we can only understand the prophasis of the Peloponnesian war if we discard
our ethics.
In such a reading of Thucydides, he appears entirely unconcerned with the justice
of war. To take that interpretation is to dismiss the passionate portrayal of human
suffering that is within his work. His descriptions of the brutality and inhuman cruelty
during the Athenian plague or the revolution of Corcyra can only shock us if we realize
that these events have violated some deep sense of human justice. Thucydides urged us
to abandon our morals to understand how war begins but then played upon our sense of
morality to describe how wrong this war was.
In a similar way readers become angry at the hypocrisy of the politicians even if
they accept Thucydides' theory of how the Peloponnesian war began. The politicians
listed numerous reasons for declaring war: the enemy has struck first, the enemy will do
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us harm in the future, or the peace between us is not just because we are in servitude to
them. In Thucydides' understanding, these are all lies because there is only one reason
for war: the preservation or expansion of power. In the case of Thucydides' narration,
the preservation and expansion of the power of the Athens.
If we look at Athens as a protagonist within Thucydides' narrative, rather than
simply as an institution in a history, it becomes very easy to read The Peloponnesian War
as a tragedy that stars Athensxxxiii. As in a tragedy, and many of Herodotos' stories,
Athens commited acts of hubris. Hubris for Athens included choosing militarist and
expansionist plans, such as the ones offered by Cleon and Alciabides, over the far-sighted
Periclean defense. The way that Thucydides juxtaposed certain events, (such as the
plague immediately following the Periclean funeral oration and the invasion of Sicily
following the Melian dialogue), suggests that these disasters are some how linked to the
preceding events. In his oration, Pericles placed Athens above all of the other poleis in
Greece, in a way similar to how tragic heroes would seek to place themselves among the
gods rather than with other mortals. In the Melian dialogue, the Athenians sought to
excuse themselves from the moral rules that normally govern human affairs. Their
justification for military expansion only brought the Athenians grief when they attempted
to use that reasoning to conquer Sicily. This reading of The Peloponnesian War suggests
that while Thucydides attempted to view the war amorally, he was drawn to write about it
because he saw it as an historical tragedy.
The injustice that we find in Thucydides' descriptions of the catastrophes of war,
the hypocrisy of politicians and the tragic interpretation of war all suggest that he thought
that the Peloponnesian war was unjust. But this position is weakened by some passages
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that find value in war itself; a value in war beyond simply a means to victory. Part of
Thucydides' narration portrays the Peloponnesian war as total war; that is a war that
obeys no morals or conventions. But Thucydides found some value inherent in war,
saying, "war is a violent teacher (3.82.2)." This militarist tendency is a result of the
creative war tradition. While creative war was primarily concerned about the
accumulation of honor, creative war also trained the next generation of young men.
To summarize, I will be exploring the following ideas in this chapter:
Thucydides' argument that the aitia of war resides in human nature, as war results from
humans following a system of power. Because humans are beings primarily concerned
with power and the pursuit of power, we can only best understand human nature if we
discard the lens of morality. Then I will argue that Thucydides' descriptions of the
horrors of war suggest that there is some sort of system of justice, otherwise these horrors
would not appear to be violations. Then I will show how the hypocrisy of the politicians
implies a moral knowledge of what is just; otherwise it would not be hypocrisy.
Furthermore, the Peloponnesian War can be read as a tragedy and the hubristic acts of the
Athens suggest that the war is unjust. Finally, despite these reasons, we cannot infer that
Thucydides would have judged the Peloponnesian War as unjust, as he also drew upon
the creative war tradition to suggest that war can be a positive force.
Like Herodotos, Thucydides searched for the cause of the war that he chronicled
in his introduction. Also like Herodotos, Thucydides reached back into myth to find
history old enough to properly frame the war. He wrote of Minos, Agamemnon and
Menelaos as they were they were actual kings, so when he stated, "The real cause,
however, I consider to be the one which was formally most kept out of sight. The growth
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of the power of Athens, and the fear which this inspired in Sparta, forced (anagkasi) them
into war," Thucydides gives the impression that his theory of power is ahistorical; that it
could just as aptly describe the past as it does the present. His comment that his work
was intended not for the present, but as a "possession for all time (1.22.4)" further implies
that this system of power does not change over time, much like Herodotos' fate.
This theory of power involves treating the various poleis of Greece as individual
actors who seek to maximize human and material resources to in order to secure their
own power or to expand their powerxxxiv. In his introduction, Thucydides gave an
account of the history of Greece in which the poleis seek to gain more dunamis. They
seek to gain more dunamis by either conquering other poleis or gaining influence over
them (1.8). As Josiah Ober notes, all the poleis, both weak and strong, appear to be
acting as a rational actors following choices that correspond to an independent system of
powerxxxv. When Thucydides wrote that Sparta attacked Athens because of anagke, this
aggression seems to be a choice that Sparta had to make in order to survive within the
system of power.
The theory of power appears to be further articulated in the Melian Dialogue. The
Athenians justify their intended hostilities against the Melians, saying:
Of the gods we believe, and of men we know, that by a necessary law of
their nature they rule wherever they can. And it is not as if we were the
first to make this law, or to act upon it when made: we found it in
existence before us, and shall leave it to exist forever after us; all we do is
to make use of it, knowing that you and everybody else, having the same
power as we have, would do the same as we do (5.105.2)
By presenting war as the result of human nature, and justice merely as a convention that
could be overturned at any moment, the Athenians argued that justice and war have no
relationship to each other. In order to understand human affairs, we must disregard any
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moral considerations, as the ture prophrasis of politics and war is the desire for power.
Just as Croesos denied any control over the war that led to his ruin by saying that no man
would choose war, that it must be caused by the gods, the Athenians avoided moral
culpability by saying that the cause of war is this system of power. The Athenians said
that they did not invent this system of power, nor can they alter events in any way to
achieve a just outcome. Additionally, this system of power is something all humans
have access to, therefore the Athenians cannot be faulted for using it. Indeed, they used
this power for their own protection, as the Melians might have done the same to them if
they had had the chance.
While Herodotos still demanded that his characters act justly despite finding the
cause of human affairs to be determined by the divine, the Athenians said that they are
not obligated to act justly. Indeed, according to their argument, they are acting justly by
attacking Melos, for by doing so they are obeying the dictate to practice arche that
applies to both humans and gods (5.105.1). War is beyond the dictates of justice, as war
is a consequence of arche, which is required by a phusis that compels all of humankind
(5.105.2).
The Melians pointed out the inhuman harshness of this reasoning, and also noted
that such a obsessive pursuit of power was not advantageous for the Athenians. For such
a philosophy only allows for alliance between people of equal power, while all others are
either potential enemies or slaves (5.89). Therefore in this paradigm, all of the islands in
the Delian League are slaves and wish for the destruction of their master, Athens. The
Melians also pointed out that such a philosophy would not incline anyone help Athens
when fortune turns against them (5.98). The Athenians remained deaf to their pleas.
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After a naval siege, all the Melian men were killed, the women and children were sold
into slavery. Thucydides ended book five by noting that the Athenians colonized Melos
with five hundred of their own people (5.116.4).
Thucydides knew that this description of the invasion of Melos was controversial.
The ancient commentator Dionysius ardently denied that Athenians would be capable of
describing their polis in such a wayxxxvi. However, Thucydides did not attempt to hide
this controversial statement. The shift into dialogue format, away from the paragraphs of
speeches and descriptions of battles, grabs the reader's attention to this bold claim about
the machinations of power. Because of this shift into format reminiscent of tragic plays
and the furor that it inspired in ancient readers like Dionysus, F.M. Cornford argued that
we should read the Melian dialogue as the justification of a tragic heroxxxvii. If we place
the Athenians as such, the Melian dialogues become the justification of an unjust act
rather than a revelation of some horrible truth.
The Athenians began the dialogue by saying that they can talk honestly because
they are not in front of the Melian citizens (5.85). But by saying that they can only talk
truthfully about human nature behind close doors, the Athenians contradict themselves. If
this desire is the essential motivation of humankind, why is it esoteric knowledge rather
than common sense? For if the desire to rule is mandated by human nature, why do they
only dare to whisper it behind closed doors? In order for this statement about the futility
of morals to be shocking, we must assume that the readers do value morality. If this
claim were true, we would not be shocked to hear it.
The intense suffering that Thucydides described in his work can make a similar
argument about how amoral statements require a moral system from which to be called
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unethical. For in his description of suffering, there is a sense that the Peloponnesian war
has violated the participants. This sense of violation would not be there if humans were
primarily concerned with archee, as they would accept the viciousness as necessary for
obtaining power.
The description of the revolution at Corcyra is a gradual crescendo of chaos and
violence that disobeys all Greek conventions for war. The chaos is so overwhelming that
afterwards Thucydides was forced to give an account for how this massacre was possible
for humans to commit. The war began, according to Thucydides, with the release of
Corinthian prisoners of war and also the trial against Peithas, a council member who was
charged with treason (3.70). Peithas was acquitted at the trial but then murdered by a
group of anti-Athenian oligarchs (3.70). The next day, both the democrats and the
oligarchs recruited non-traditional troops: slaves joined the democrat faction while the
oligarchs recruited 800 mercenaries from the mainland (3.73). Later in the day, women
joined the battle by hurling roof-tiles (3.74). With the arrival of the Athenian navy, there
was a temporary cessation of violence as the oligarchs withdrew to the temple of Hera
(3.75). Eventually, the democrats, enthused by the Athenian support, demanded that the
oligarchs submit themselves to trial (3.81). The fifty who submitted themselves were all
put to death, causing those who remained in the temple to kill each other, to hang
themselves or to commit suicide by other means (3.81).
After this description of mass suicide, Thucydides commented on the nature of
the violence and also described even more horrific forms of violence: patricide, filicide
and sacrireligious murder. He wrote:
Death thus raged in every shape; and, as usually happens at such times,
there was no length to which violence did not go; sons were killed by their
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fathers, and suppliants dragged from the altar or slain upon it, while some
were even walled up in the temple of Dionysus and died there. (3.81.5)
This passage pictures an even more violent and unjust situation than the war Croesos had
described. Rather than father burying sons, in Corcyra fathers murder their sons. While
Thucydides remained silent on the matter of the gods, he noted that the sanctity of the
temple grounds cannot prevent the slaughter. The temples, rather being a place for
rejoicing in life, became catacombs for the living dead. Thucydides described a situation
that is completely contrary to the just peace, the natural order of the cosmos, to which
humans are accustomed.
The horror of this situation betrays a moral knowledge. In order for this massacre
to shock the audience as it does, it requires a moral system that speaks to issues of justice
in war. Specifically, this system of justice says that ideologies should not divide and
destroy families and that wars should not violate sacred temples. Thucydides expected
the scene at Corcyra to unsettle his audience so much that immediately following it he
has to step back from the narrative and attempt to explain how such horrors could occur.
From 3.82 to 3.85, Thucydides commented on the nature of humankind and the nature of
life under war. Here he located the origin of war within human nature (ee anthropia
phusis) and noted that it acted contrary to a system of justice (para tous nomous adikein):
Then, with the ordinary conventions of civilized life thrown into
confusion, human nature, always ready to offend even where laws exist,
showed itself proudly in its true colors, as something incapable of
controlling passions. (3.84.2)
We can see clearly here that Thucydides felt that there was a proper relationship of war to
justice, but that it was not followed in the Corcyrean revolution. He did not find this
violence remarkable, as these actions are to be expected given the quality of human
nature. From Corcyra, we can deduce that a just war for Thucydides would be one that
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did not cut across family ties nor violate religious grounds. By noting what Thucydides
considered unjust wars, we can construct a proto-theory of what Thucydides would have
considered a just war.
The hypocritical nature of the politicians provides ample opportunities for what
Thucydides considered unjust actions. As Walzer says, "Wherever we find hypocrisy, we
find moral knowledge."xxxviii Just as a moral system is necessary for us to be shocked by
atrocities, a common moral system is necessary for hypocrisy. Hypocrisy requires a
common moral system that the hypocrite ignores but then argues that he followed. We
can construct a theory of what Thucydides would consider proper ad bellum
qualifications for a just war. For example, all of the politicians attempted to disguise the
fact that they struck first in war or that they are fighting a war of aggression. We can
understand from this that Thucydides felt that wars of aggression, that is, wars fought
with the intent of conquest or political domination of another group of people, were
unjust.
For example, when the Spartan king Archadamos said a prayer before invading
Platea, he consciously avoided describing his army as an invading army:
Gods and heroes of the land of Platea, bear witness with me that from the
beginning it was in no spirit of aggression, but only because these people
had first broken their engagements with us, that we invaded this land in
which our father offered their prayers to you before they defeated the
Persians and which you made a place of good omen for the warfare of the
Hellenes; nor, in our actions now, shall we be acting aggressively. We
have made a number of reasonable proposals, but these have not been
accepted. Grant us your aid, therefore, and see to it that the punishment
for what has been done wrong may fall on those who were the first to do
evil, and that we may be successful in our aim, which is a just revenge
(2.74)
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Archadamos believed that the divine guardians of Platea, their gods and heroes, would
view his invasion as an unjust war of aggression. Therefore, he very carefully
demonstrated that the Spartans are not invading Platea with the explicit purpose of
enslaving the inhabitants or taking their resources. Archadamos instead emphasized that
they were invading Platea because Platea had broken their treaty with Sparta. We can
infer from this example that Archadamos knew that wars of aggression were unjust,
otherwise he would not have had to disguise his invasion as revenge for a broken treaty.
Thucydides attempted to explain the hypocrisy of leaders like Archadmos with his system
of power. The leaders were willing to disregard any form of moral convention if to do so
would enable them to obtain more power. However, while Thucydides attempted to
describe the Peloponnesian war amorally, as Cornford noted, he drew upon tragic
narratives and structures in order to do soxxxix.
To read the Peloponnesian war as a tragedy is almost to deny that Thucydides
viewed the world any differently than Herodotos. In Greek tragedy, tragic humans live
within an anthropocentric cosmos that responds to their moral decisions. But it is
possible to read these elements into Thucydides' work. Cornford argued that while
Thucydides consciously rejected inserting any sort of mythical element into his writing;
because his only literary forbearers were either poets or tragedians, it was impossible for
Thucydides to escape completely their influencexl. As the narratives within either epic
myth or tragic plays often have a moral interpretation, we can find Thucydides' moral
judgments about war if we view his work through the tragic lens that Cranford described.
To read the Peloponnesian war as a tragedy Athens becomes the protagonist.
Thucydides began to talk of poleis as individual actors in his introduction and freely
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interchanges discussion of poleis and the citizens of a polis. If we look at the poleis as
individuals, we can adopt the systems of honor and hubris that had previously only been
given to individuals. In this context, Thucydides appears as a despairing moralist,
connecting the decline of Athens for her attempts to be more than she was sanctioned to
be under the systems of honor.
While Thucydides practically mocked the oracular interpretations of the plague at
Athens (2.54), in the segment before, he had Pericles articulate the many virtues of the
Athenian citizens and their polis (2.41). Pericles even said, "Our city is an education to
Greece (2.41)" and further cites the Athens' political power as proof of its greatness. The
juxtaposition of the plague immediately after Pericles' speech suggests that cosmos did
not agree that Athens was meant to be an education to Greece. Although Thucydides
turned the readers towards doctors rather than priests to find the original cause of the
disease (2.48), Thucydides made it easy for his readers to assume that Athens was being
punished for hubris. Specifically, attempting to be more than just a polis but a polis for
all of Greece.
The plague that struck Athens resulted in as a severe disruption of the cosmic
balance as the Corcyrean revolution. Thucydides noted that, "Fear of gods or law of men
there was none (2.53.3)," to explain the shortsighted hedonism that many men adopted.
This description implies that the proper relationship between gods and men had been
abandoned, just as it was during the scenes of sacrareligious murder at the temples in
Corcyra. But more horrible than this shunning of the proper cultural mores was the
dissolution of communal bonds. Thucydides noted that the contagious nature of the
plague often caused the afflicted to die alone. For the plague would kill those who had

Thucydides

55

honorably offered aid to the sick (2.51.5) and households would even turn out their own
family members, "worn out by the moans of the dying and succumbing to the force of the
disaster."(2.51.6) The bonds of family and civic duty, which Pericles had so artfully
extolled in his funeral oration, were completely unraveled by the plague. The close
juxtaposition of Pericles' speech to this disaster implies some sort of causation, especially
given the Greek tradition of interpreting sickness as divine retribution.
In a similar way, the disaster that the Athenians suffered due to the Sicilian
expedition can be read as punishment for hubris. Thucydides foreshadowed the ill results
with his descriptions of why the Athenians decided to go to war, hinting that the entire
cause of the war was the base appetites of the Athenians:
There was a passion for the enterprise which affected everyone alike. The
older men thought that they would either conquer the places against which
they were sailing, or, in any case, with such a large force, could come to
no harm; the young had a longing for the sights and experiences of distant
places and were confident that they would return safely; the general
masses and the average soldier himself saw the prospect of getting pay for
the time being and of adding to the empire so as to secure permanent paid
employment for the future. (6.24)
Here, both the old men and the youth commit the hubris of thinking themselves immortal
(and thereby equivalent to the gods). The masses and the soldiers favor the war solely for
monetary gain, implying that they support the Sicilian expedition as a war of conquest
and domination. Thucydides described the Athenians as people who see themselves as
being able to change the world for their own interests quite easily. That is to say, rather
than seeking balance within the cosmos, these Athenians attempted to impose themselves
on the universe.
Thucydides dived into the psyche of the Athenians during the destruction of the
fleet at Sicily. At this event, Thucydides noted that the expedition has brought about the
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completely opposite of which the Athenians expected. Rather than joy at victory, they
feel "a profound sense of shame and deep feelings of reproach,"(7.75) rather than
expanding the Athenian hegemony, they "were going away frightened of being enslaved
themselves."(7.75.7) This complete destruction of morale occurred amidst a battle that
violated many of the Greek war conventions:
The dead were unburied, and when any man recognized one of his friends
lying among them, he was filled with grief and fear; and the living who,
whether sick or wounded, were being left behind caused more pain than
did the dead to those who were left alive…(7.75)
In addition to Athenians losing the Sicilian expedition, they lost the battle in a disgraceful
way. Thucydides linked the Athenians' plans, the decision to invade Sicily, to the
consequences of their action, the rout at Sicily. But he also connected the emotional
intentions of the Athenians during the planning stage, their greed and arrogance, to their
emotional state during the rout, grief and fear. In doing so, in a way Thucydides says that
the consequence of greed and arrogance is grief and fear. This emotional
consequentialism, of greed and arrogance turning into grief and fear, is the basic
emotional narrative of a tragedy.
We have seen Thucydides describe the Peloponnesian War as tragic, unjust and
inevitable. But Thucydides also wrote within the creative war tradition and because of
this tradition, Thucydides found something valuable in war. During creative warfare, war
was thought as an essential way to gain honor. However, rather than being concerned
with gaining honor Thucydides found war as somehow connected to justice.
Thucydides began his work by writing that the Peloponnesian War was "a great
war and more worthwhile writing about than any in the past."(1.1.1) This comment tells
us that Thucydides was drawn to write about the Peloponnesian war because it was a war,

Thucydides

57

similarly to the ones about Homer and Herodotos wrote. Thucydides justified his
fascination with war after his description of the Corcyrean revolution:
In peace and prosperity states and individuals have better sentiments,
because they not find themselves suddenly confronted with imperious
necessities; but war takes away the easy supply of daily wants and so
proves a rough teacher (didaskalos) that brings most men's characters to
their fortunes (3.82.2)
This passage recalls Heraclitus' praise of war, "war is the king of all… and has made
some men slaves and some men free."xli So while Thucydides attempted to describe war
only using the language of total war, as which war is only a means, he nonetheless found
some value in war itself. He did not find war valuable because it allowed men to gain
honor, which is the basis of the creative war tradition. Instead, Thucydides argued that
war was essential to understanding human nature.
In order to do justice in documenting the Peloponnesian war, Thucydides quieted
his narrative voice. But while he primarily documented events and recreated political
speeches, he nonetheless intervened in the text and attempted to guide the readers to a
specific interpretation of the war. In these interventions, Thucydides sought to describe
the war as an inevitable and amoral result of a system of power. But, Thucydides can
only do justice to the descriptions of these horrors by relying on the moral system that he
had earlier rejected as inadequate for accounting for the origins of the war. In a similar
way, in order for the audience to be indignant about the hypocrisy of the politicians, we
must have a system of justice for them to violate. Additionally, for Athens to fall from
being a polis that all of Greece to aspire and to become a polis that indulges the base
appetites of its citizens, there must be some sort of justice from which they had strayed in
order to create revulsion in the readers.
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Thus despite his apparently dispassionate stance, Thucydides can tell us much
about the relationship of justice and war. From the Corycrean revolution we can see that
war is not supposed to break familial or civic bonds. Additionally, war is not supposed to
cross religious boundaries: sanctuaries should be respected. Likewise, the boundaries of
other poleis should be respected, wars of aggression are unjust. The unjust nature of wars
of aggression can be seen the way that Athenian expedition is described: the fear and
grief that the Athenians feel is a result of the greed and arrogance that initiated the
expedition in the first place.
But finding a prototype of a just war theory within the Peloponnesian War is
further complicated by the presence of the creative war tradition that continues to
resonate within Thucydides' work. Thucydides found some positive aspects of war and
thought that war was necessary for understanding the human condition. His description
of war as a didaskalos suggests that even though war is responsible for a multitude of
horrors, Thucydides also saw war as the origin of virtues such as justice. In the next
chapter, Plato builds upon this idea, as he made the experience of war an essential aspect
for the creation of a just polis.
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…emon eie to dianapauesthai pukna en autais,
logois te allelous paramuthoumenous ten
odon apasan outo meta rastones diaperanai.
Laws, 625b
Plato saw war and justice as closely bound together. In the Republic, war is a
necessary component for training the guardians, and therefore it is a necessary part of the
composition of a just polis, the kallipolis (467b). Like Thucydides, Plato saw the
ultimate cause of war to be human nature. But unlike Thucydides, who described war as
a product of a system of power incompatible with justice, Plato argued that war could be
controlled and that some form of justice could be formed from this human nature. For
modern readers, the purpose of having this control over the beginning of war would be to
eliminate war and create peace. However, Plato did not pursue creating continuous
peace, as he saw war as integral to the creation and maintenance of justice. In requiring
some sort of war to continue to exist for the sake of the human soul, Plato borrows from
and reinvigorates the Greek creative war tradition.
However, due to structure of the Platonic dialogue, it is difficult to present Plato's
thought on a complex subject such as creative war. In order to investigate Plato's
dialogues thoroughly, I will examine The Republic, The Statesman and The Laws
independently before examining his work as a whole and his thoughts on justice and war.
Even if Plato can be said to rejuvenate the creative war tradition in the Republic, he also
changed it in several key ways. For the warfare in the kallipolis serves the purpose of
justice, while creative warfare was for the accumulation of honor. This subservient
position of warfare to justice is explicitly stated in both the Statesman (305e) and the
Laws (628d). In the Statesman, warfare is examined as a potential episteme worthy of
ordering the polis. However, ultimately Plato argued that politikee should be superior to

61

Plato
warfare as warfare itself is not concerned with the proper ordering of the polis. Put
another way, politikee is decreed superior to warfare because the telos of politikee is

justice. Plato described a similar type of separation of the ends of warfare and politics in
the Laws. In the Laws, the Athenian Stranger challenged how war is posited as the rasion
d’estat of both Sparta and Crete. While the Athenian Stranger never doubted war was an
effective way to protect a polis, he argued that war should not be the primary purpose of
the polis, for to do so is contrary to the cultivation of human virtue. In all three of Plato’s
most explicitly political works, war is described as a tool in the service of justice.
In describing war and justice as a human endeavor, Plato departed from both
Herodotos and Thucydides. For while Herodotos wished to judge humans for their just
or unjust behavior, his writings reveal a faith in the ability of the cosmos to correct
injustices. Like Thucydides, Plato had no such faith that the cosmos itself would correct
injustice. However, Thucydides did not see justice as a meaningful way of viewing
human affairs and instead argued that war and politics could best be understood as results
of a system of power. Justice, for Thucydides, is meaningless. Plato had neither the
optimism of Herodotos nor the pessimism of Thucydides. Rather, justice occurs as a
result of conscious human decisions. The Republic, The Statesman and The Laws are all
concerned about the types of human decisions, that can be consciously made, that are
necessary for the construction of a just polis.
Given this belief on the human ability to create justice, why would Plato revive
creative war traditions in the Republic? Before we consider his philosophical reasoning, I
want to elaborate on Plato’s historical and political context. Plato’s writings were
obviously influenced by the execution of his mentor Socrates, but we should also
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remember that he was writing after the Peloponnesian war. While the Athenians had
restored their democracy and to a lesser extent their empire, the war had long lasting
impact on Athens, due to the massive loss of life to the war, to the plague and the
instability of the Athenian government with the Thirty Tyrants' attempt to seize power.

The Peloponnesian War was, as Thucydides noted, an event unprecedented to the Greek
world. Plato's thoughts on the proper relation between justice and war may have been
aimed to prevent another such war and to control stasis within the polis.
But while Plato may have been interested in preventing such an all encompassing
war, he was not interested in preventing all wars. For even in the kallipolis, which is just,
wise, courageous and moderate, there is still war. The kallipolis fights wars not only to
protect itself, but also to train its guardians and to ensure that it has sufficient resources to
provide itself with luxuries (Republic 373d). Plato outlined a Just War Theory for the
kallipolis, detailing on what occasions it should go to war and how it should fight wars.
However, the applicability of this theory to political decisions is unclear. For Socrates
stated that his intention in describing this “city made of words” was ultimately to be able
to describe the soul of a just man (369a). Because of this statement, and several other
textual suggestions, we must remember that the imaginary just polis is primarily intended
to explain how an individual should be just. Such a description is not devoid of political
significance, as the psychological origins of war have political consequences. But even if
discussion of justice in war is allegorical, we can nonetheless say that the Republic
contains a proto Just War Theory. This discussion is significant for no other reason than
it was the first explicit discussion of the connection between justice and war.
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The Just City Just War Theory in the Republic, like the Just War Theory later
developed along the framework developed by St. Augustine, can be divided into ius ad
bellum and ius in bello. Plato did not intend for his thoughts on justice and war to be
divided in such a way, as he approached the problem of war holistically. However, for

the purpose of this paper, exploring the Greek dialogue on justice and war, we will make
this division. Ius ad bellum outlines the particular ends for which is it is permissible for
the just city to go to war. The ends that Socrates names were: self-protection and
conquering enough territory to ensure self-sufficiency. Both of these ends would suggest
that war for the sake of war would not be just. But in a particular way, war is necessary
for the continued existence of the kallipolis beyond simple defense, as it is an integral
part of the guardians' training. Because war is essential to the continuity of the kallipolis,
Plato's theory of war has many similarities to the Greek creative war tradition. For one of
the key tenets of the Just War Theory that occurred after St. Augustine is that a just war
should be fought for the sake of creating peace and that war should only be used as a last
resort.
What is important to understand about ius ad bellum for the just polis, is that there
are different types of wars fought for material gain. In Book II, Socrates argued that the
kallipolis will have to:
…cut off a piece of our neighbor's land, if we are going to have sufficient
for pasture and tillage, and they in turn from ours, if they let themselves go
to the unlimited acquisition of money, overstepping the boundary of the
necessary?...After that won't we go to war as a consequence? (Republic
373d)
In this passage, Socrates argued that war fought for resources that will make the kallipolis
self-sufficient is justified. For Socrates, the difference between resources that make one

64

Plato
sufficient and one affluent, is an essential distinction, because unless the kallipolis is

economically self-sufficient, it will not be able to create the policies necessary to achieve
justice. Therefore, attaining the resources to be self-sufficient is paramount. However,
Socrates seemed to have some feeling that the morality of war for material gain is
suspect. The questionability of the morality of this type of war leads Socrates explicitly
delay discussion about the justice of war, saying that "Let's not yet say whether war
works evil or good ."(373e) However, later in the dialogue, Socrates stressed the
importance of not fighting for material gain.
After the kallipolis has been founded, Socrates envisioned the kallipolis existing
amidst unjust poleis. Because of this situation, the kallipolis will be forced to defend
itself from other poleis which will seek to support their affluent lives by taking the
resources of the kallipolis. Socrates argued that the kallipolis will be able to defend itself
through its guardians and by allying with other unjust poleis (422d). From this passage
we can deduce that Socrates considered wars of defense to be justified. Also, in this
passage we see the essential difference for Socrates between resources for selfsufficiency and for affluence. According to Socrates, the kallipolis will easily find allies,
for the guardians will be able to offer the allies all the spoils of war:
What if they sent an embassy to the other city and told the truth? 'We
make use of neither gold nor silver, nor is it lawful for us, while it is for
you. So join us in making war and keep the others' property' (422d).
In this passage it is clear that once the kallipolis has sufficient resources, it should not
seek more. To do so would be unjust, as it would push the polis towards affluence and all
the corresponding vices. What is interesting is that while this defensive war is just for the
kallipolis, Plato gave the impression that he was not at all interested in making the unjust
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poleis more just. For the guardians gather support for the just polis by manipulating the
vices of other poleis and making no effort to correct their perversions.
Howevever, a war is not just for the kallipolis simply because it passes ius ad
bellum qualifications; the guardians had to fight wars in a specific way. However, the ius
in bello guidelines for the guardians depend on whether or not the enemy is Greek. At
this point in the Republic, Socrates redefined war. In Book V, he declared that war can
only occur between two groups who are naturally opposed to each other (470c). Because
of this reasoning, any fighting between Greeks is not war, but rather a form of stasis; civil
war (470c). Reclassifying war in such a way, required the guardians to be: "…lovers of
the Greeks. Won't they consider Greece their own and hold the common holy places
along with the other Greeks?" (470e) Socrates used this classification in order to give the
reasoning for the war conventions that he outlined for battles among the kallipolis and
other poleis. The foundation for the ius in bello is the love that naturally occurs amongst
Greeks and the enmity that occurs naturally between Greeks and barbarians.
When Socrates argued that Greeks can only be at war with barbarians, he said that
all Greeks are friends by phusis (470c). Therefore, for Greeks to fight against each other
is contrary to nature. This appeal to phusis for the foundation of a pan-Hellenic peace
seems to run contrary to what Socrates had argued earlier in Book II. For in Book II,
after saying that in order to found the just polis one would have to go to war in order to
obtain sufficient land, he said "…we have found the origin of war- in those things whose
presence in cities most of all produces evils both private and public (373e)." In order to
reconcile these two statements, we must argue that in order to found the kallipolis, one is
required to do an unjust act: make war against fellow Greeks. For as inferred in Book II,
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and stated explicitly in Book V, the kallipolis can only come from a Greek society

(470e). I will elaborate more about reconciling these two statements when talking about
the applicability of the Just City Just War Theory.
But while war with fellow Greeks is contrary to human nature, it is in fact natural
for the kallipolis to be at war with barbarians (470c). This naturalization of hostilities
would mean that the kallipolis would not require a specified reason to be at war with nonGreeks. To put it another way, the kallipolis would not need to justify going to war with
non-Greeks to their citizenry because their citizenry would always have echthra towards
barbarians (470c). Therefore, in Just City Just War Theory, not only is there a distinction
between fighting for material gain for self-sufficiency and fighting for material gain for
affluence but also a distinction between fighting Greeks and barbarians. The kallipolis
would not need as strong an argument to go to war with barbarians as it would to go to
war with Greeks.
Socrates argued that the kallipolis would follow very specific guidelines for
fighting wars against Greeks. These guidelines result from the logic that the guardians
will view Greeks as their kin. Because the kallipolis views other poleis as family, they
will not hate them, even in war. Therefore, the guardians, as Greeks,
won't ravage Greece or burn houses, nor will they agree that in any city all
are their enemies- men, women and children, but there are always a few
enemies who are to blame for the differences. And, on all these grounds,
they won't be willing to ravage lands or tear down houses, since the many
are friendly; and they'll keep up the quarrel until those to blame are
compelled to pay the penalty by the blameless ones who are suffering
(471a).
Socrates seems to be suggesting that in a war against another Greek poleis, the kallipolis
will act more like a foreign police force rather than an enemy state. Because their focus
is to destroy only those who had initiated war, guardians will not ravage the land nor
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cause undue destruction and neither will they enslave any captured Greeks (469b) nor
plunder the corpses of the enemy (469d). These guidelines for ius in bello for the
kallipolis against Greeks seem completely contrary to the ruthlessness which was

necessary for the guardians to defend themselves from invaders. For when the guardians
were seeking allies, they were not concerned with correcting their allies' behavior. For if
the guardians had fought this war it would be unjust. But it is apparently not unjust for
the guardians to enlist other poleis in this war (422d). But while Socrates detailed
specific ways later in which the kallipolis improves the lives of other poleis, the kallipolis
has no obligation to make barbarians more just.
While Socrates was vocal about the proper way to fight Greeks, he did not
describe any standard for fighting non-Greeks. We can, however, deduce from the way
that he describes fighting against Greeks the standards for ius in bello against barbarians.
After Socrates described the guidelines for fighting other Greeks, Glaucon said, "I agree
that our citizens must behave this way towards their opponents; and towards barbarians
they must behave as Greeks do now toward one another."(471b) Put another way, when
the kallipolis fights barbarians, it is completely permissible to strip the enemy's corpse, to
enslave an enemy and to burn and ravage their land.
Now that we have explored the guidelines that Plato wrote were necessary for the
kallipolis both for ius ad bellum and ius in bello, we need to explore how war is integral
to the survival of the city. I will delay questioning why this occurs until I discuss how
the kallipolis is supposed to relate to political life. I have already shown that war is
essential to the establishment of the kallipolis, now I will show that war is necessary for
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its contiuation. War is necessary not only for the proper education of the guardians, but
also for ensuring all citizens in the polis have a common experience.
In Book V, Socrates discussed how the kallipolis will conduct all affairs in
common. He argues that this unified experience is necessary because:
Then is the best governed which is most like a single human being? For
example, when one of us wounds a finger, presumably the entire
community- that community tying the body together with the soul in a
single arrangement under the ruler? (462c)
One political experience that has the ability to unify the polis to such a great extent is
war. In order to ensure that war is fought completely in common, the guardians will:
…carry out their campaigns in common, and, besides, they'll lead all the
hardy children to war, so that, like the children of other craftsmen, they
can see what they'll have to do in their craft when they are grown up
(466e)
Fighting in the presence of children, for Socrates, not only has the advantage of unifying
the city and teaching the children war craft, it will in fact further inspire the warriors to
fight better. This ferociousness occurs naturally because "…every animal fights
exceptionally hard in the presence of its offspring (467a)." From these passages we can
see that to fight war is not simply necessary to establish peace for the kallipolis, but that it
is necessary both for the education of warriors and also for the unification of the
citizenry. Unlike, in the Statesman or the Laws, war in the Republic serves more
functions in the creation of peace than simply the establishment of security; war is cast as
both a teacher and a unifier for the kallipolis.
War teaches and unites kallipolis, but what affect does war have on a normal
polis? To answer this question we must turn towards the question of how the kallipolis
relates to everyday life. I have postponed this discussion because to answer it requires
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some sort of analysis of the Republic as a whole. I will draw upon the work of C.D.C.

Reeve, who argues that the Republic provides a consistent and systematic argument about
justice. Afterwards, I will talk about how war is discussed in relation to justice in both
the Statesman and the Laws. The transition from the Republic to the other texts will be
easy because the sections of all three texts that I'm interested in concern not only war and
justice but also Plato's study of the soul.
Reeve argues that Socrates goes about building his "city of words" in such a way
that there are three distinct cities: The first city is mentioned in Book II, in which men
and women live in-between poverty and affluence. The second city is described throughout Books III and IV; it is the city of the guardians. The third city is the city of the
philosopher-kingsxlii. Each polis contains all the social structures of the proceeding city,
but during the course of the dialogue Socrates is forced to make some fundamental
change to the structure of the polis in order to account for a different aspect of the human
psychee.xliii The simple city was not sufficient because it could not provide for the
desires of honorific men. The guardian city was not sufficient because it could not
provide for philosophers. What this tripartite division of the kallipolis allows us to see is
that in each section in which war is discussed extensively, war is described in relation to
either the simple city or the guardian city. Indeed, war is a necessary function of both the
first kallipolis and the second kallipolis: War is required to gain sufficient materials to
found the simple city while the guardians can only guard their city if they can fight war.
While the kallipolis of the philosopher-king requires the philosopher-king to be
knowledgeable of military affairs and also to have a courageous spirit (534c), war is not a
necessity for this kallipolis as it was for the previous two. In order to understand this

70

Plato

division of the kallipolis, and how these divisions relate to life outside the kallipolis, we
must turn to Plato's division of the soul.
One of the famous accounts in Republic is the division of the human psychee into
rationality, appetite and the spirited element (493d-e). We can understand the three
different kallipoleis to have been constructed in order to accommodate these various parts
of the human psychee: The simple city to accommodate the appetites, the guardian city
to accommodate the spirited element and the philosopher-kings to accommodate the
rational element. We might be encouraged to view the cities in this way if we remember
the original purpose of these cities: to locate justice within a single man (369a).
But if we are to view all the political discussion in the Republic as an allegory for
the proper structuring of one's soul, does the Republic truly have anything to tell us about
the relationship between war and justice? In a way, yes. For Plato has located the
primary cause of war in the human psyche. The war is a result of the appetites or the
spirited element. In a way, this is similar to Thucydides' location of the cause of war as
human nature (Thucydides 3.84.2). But unlike Thucydides, Plato saw human rationality
as a way to control the appetite and human spiritedness and therefore to control war.
This control can then be used to create both peace and justice.
Rationality controls both appetite and spiritedness, striking a balance both within
the two and between the two. The appetites in the kallipolis are satiated by the resources
that the kallipolis had seized from other Greek poleis during its formation. But the
appetites are not allowed to dictate the course of action; many steps are taken to ensure
that the citizens of the kallipolils do not develop a taste for the extravagent. The spirited
element polices the appetites and ensures that they do not overwhelm rationality. Just as
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the appetites are neither underfed nor overindulged, the spirited element is neither

underdeveloped nor overdeveloped. For if it is underdeveloped in the kallipolis, spirited
and unjust men from other poleis will conquer the kallipolis. But if the spirited element
is overdeveloped, the kallipolis will begin to value honor more than rationality, causing
the just community's disintegration (548c).
Even if we read the Republic primarily as an explanation of how an individual
may act justly, the dialogue also explains how a political community relates to justice and
war. Put another way, if we attempt to read the Republic only as an exploration of
individual psychology, the allegory of the kallipolis nonetheless presents political
solutions to the problem of justice. These political solutions would involve the correct
balancing of the souls of all the inhabitants within the polis.
Plato also found the cause of war inside the human psyche in the Statesman, in
which he further elaborated the necessity of war being subservient to justice in the
Statesman. However, he elaborated in an indirect way, as the Statesman is primarily
concerned about exploring the various elements of politikee, statesmanship. But this
dialogue is of interest to us because the Stranger has the Young Socrates come to the
conclusion that statesmanship and the art of generals are distinct and separate. In
addition to this conclusion, the Stranger argued that a polis must find some sort of
balance between those who are inclined towards aggression and those who are inclined
towards peace. Such a balance is of paramount importance because a imbalance
threatens the safety of the polis both internally and externally.
But before the Stranger discussed the origins of war, he first showed the Young
Socrates that the only knowledge which is appropriate for ruling the polis is politikee. He
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considered several areas of knowledge, including that of the juror and the general
(Statesman 305b and 304e). The other area of knowledge essential for the statesman is
that of rhetoric and public speaking (304d). The Stranger argued that the craft of the
statesman concerns all three of these knowledges (305e).
After establishing the proper role of statesmanship, the Stranger described both

the origins of war and how to control it in order to create peace. The origin of war, like
in the Republic, is in the human psyche. But the Stranger did not suggest a tripartite
division of the soul, but instead made a bifurcation between those who are inclined
towards aggression and those who are inclined towards peace (307c-e). Unlike the
psychic division in the Republic, the Stranger did not advocate the superiority of a
particular element of the soul. Rather, a balance must be struck between these two
aspects. If a polis contains too many souls inclined towards aggression, "men come into
violent conflict with one another on many issues (307d)." On the other hand, if a polis
contains too many souls inclined towards peace, "they and their children and all the
community to which they belong wake up to find that their freedom is gone and that they
have been reduced to slavery."(307e) But while this psychology does not allocate
rationality to a position with the psyche, the proper way to balance the soul nonetheless
makes use of intelligence and rationality: the rationality of the statesman.
For in order to create a polis worthy of his craft, the Stranger argued that the
statesman will manipulate the stock of his citizens in order to create a people who will
neither thirst for war nor become cowards. In a passage reminiscent of the copulation
ceremonies detailed in the Republic (459e), the Stranger explained the procedures
necessary to generate this citizenry: A combination of breeding (310b), games and
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competition, education and excommunication (308d-e). The Stranger did not describe
what part of the statesman's soul will direct this weaving of the polis (308d). However,
we can assume that the statesman will be using the knowledge, politikee, that the
dialogue had spent so long defining. Use of this knowledge requires rationality.

Therefore we can say that in order to create a peaceful and just polis, the statesman, like
the philosopher-king, needs to use rationality to control the human psyche and create
justice. This justice is a balance between avoiding unnecessary wars while having the
proper spiritedness available in his population to fight defensive wars.
Plato continued to argue that rationality can be used to create peace and justice
and to avoid war in the Laws. The Laws appears to be constructing a completely opposite
argument at the beginning of the dialogue, as Clinias the Cretan argued on behalf of his
lawgiver that all states are in continuous war with one another. But the Athenian quickly
intervened and argued that in constructing a polis in that way, with a telos of constant
war, one loses the possibility of creating a polis that fosters all the virtues. Unlike the
Republic, the virtuous polis that the three men construct is not ruled by philosophy. They
also disregarded one of the central propositions in the Statesman (295c), that laws will
never be an effective way to rule a polis because laws are blind. Rather than empowering
a statesman to weave the proper elements of the polis together, the three men in the Laws
see law as a reflection of the community. In this way, the polis uses its collective
rationality, in the form of the laws, to overcome the aggression that inclines humanity
towards war.
The Cretan Clinias began the dialogue by saying that his polis was designed to be
at constant war with all foreign poleis. He bragged that the legislator who designed
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Cretan laws was wise in seeing that "all [poleis] are engaged in a continuous lifelong
warfare against all cities (626a)." Beyond praising the wisdom on the true nature of
human affairs, Clinias said that, "the peace of which most men talk is no more than a

name; in real fact, the normal attitude of a city to all others cities is one of undeclared war
(626a)." The Athenian admitted that the advantage of legislating a polis in that way is
that the polis will never be conquered and also cultivates the virtue of courage within the
citizens (628d).
However, the Athenian doubted how accurate this analysis of the interactions of
poleis is. He asked why should only poleis be at constant war with one another. Why not
villages against villages, households against households or man against man (626c)? In
fact, he went beyond social relations and asked: "Must we regard each man as his own
enemy?"(626d) Surprisingly, the Cretan willingly accepted this deconstruction of his
argument. The Cretan accepts this turn of events because he does not desire peace.
Instead, he wished for the victory of the better part of an individual man, a household, a
village and a polis (627a). Using these terms, the three men come to the agreement that
the desirable state, of which the laws they will then detail will seek to construct, is one in
which the better part of the polis is victorious (627b). The Athenian noted that this state,
in which the better part of the polis is victorious, could result from either stasis or
friendship and reconciliation (628b). Furthermore, the Athenian argued that this internal
war is not a good, but a type of evil:
"But the best is neither war nor faction (stasis)- they are things we should
pray to be spared from- but peace and mutual good will. And thus a
victory of a city over itself turns out, it would seem, to be not so much a
good as a necessity. It is as though one fancied that a diseased body which
has been subjected to medical purgation were at its best in that condition,
and ignored a body which as never stood in need of such treatment. So, if
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a man takes a similar view of the happiness of the city, or indeed, of the
individual man- I mean, if external wars are the first and only object of his
regard- he will never be a true statesman, nor will any man be a finished
legislator, unless he legislates for war as a means to peace, rather than for
peace as a means for war (628c-d)
What I want to emphasize this passage is two things: firstly, that peace is the
proper telos of war. Secondly, that war will not be eliminated. While it is an evil, it is

necessary in order for the best part of the polis to conquer. Thus, like in the Republic and
the Statesman, war is a result of a condition within the human soul. In all three texts war
is a state that should be avoided, as peace is superior. However, despite the superiority of
peace, war is necessary for the creation and continuation of a just polis. This proper
balance of ensuring that war does not become the telos of the polis, while still fighting
the wars that ensure that virtuous part of the polis survives.
The Athenian argued that the best way for the polis to obtain and retain this
balance is through law. He compared the decision making process of a polis to that of an
individual:
He has, besides, anticipations of the future and, these of two sorts. The
common name for both sorts is expectation, the special name for
anticipation of pain being fear, and for anticipation of its opposite,
confidence. And on top of all, there is judgment, to discern which of these
states is better or worse, and when judgment takes the form of a public
decision of a polis, it has the name law. (644d)
Therefore, we can see that a form of rationality, law, will be entrusted to ensure that the
polis has the proper mixture of aggression. This balance of aggressiveness ensures that
the polis can survive attacks by unjust men and also not become unjust itself. Therefore,
even though Plato found the origin of war, he did not wish to eliminate it.
In the Laws, Plato argued that poleis should primarily be concerned with the
virtue of their citizens rather than be overly concerned with preparations of war. While
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preparation for war is necessary in order to ensure that the polis exists, the Laws of the
polis, as a form of collective rationality, must ensure that war is always fought for the
sake of peace
It is this necessity of war in all three of Plato's texts, despite the acknowledged

superiority of peace, in which I find that Plato reinvigorated the creative war tradition in
Greece. For in the creative war tradition, war is desired because it is necessary for the
accumulation of honor. Because the societies that practice creative war are honor
focused societies, the warriors who participate in creative warfare are willing to risk their
lives in order to have the chance to gather that honor around which their society revolves.
In this society, the origin of war is the desire to attain honor. Plato acknowledged this
desire for honor and for aggression, but rather than allowing them to become a focal point
of a just society, he used them as tools for the construction of justice. Because this
spiritedness was such an essential tool, a just polis could not exist without war.
However, while war could not be eliminated, it could be controlled. Plato lived
during the Peloponnesian war and experienced its aftermath, which in addition to death
and population displacement, caused great political unrest. No doubt in thinking about
politics, he wished to avoid such a calamity in the future. It is quite possible that Plato
recognized the difference between the Peloponnesian war and the Homeric wars: that the
Peloponnesian war was fought for political reasons while Homeric warfare was
concerned with honor. The Peloponnesian war was fought with an intense desire on both
side to achieve victory, with a disregard for any sort of war convention. Plato did not put
any faith in treaties among poleis as a way to prevent another Peloponnesian war. While
he outlined rules of warfare for the guardians of the kallipolis to obey, he primarily
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intended to avoid such a horrific war by creating a political situation in which wars were
not fought for conquest or for the expansion of power. Rather, wars would be fought for
the protection of virtuous poleis. Thus in order to protect itself, a just polis would require
some degree of aggression.
This aggressiveness could be controlled in such a way that war does not rule
human affairs. The key towards controlling this aggression is rationality. Rationality can
then direct this aggression to the construction of justice. Aggression is necessary to the
construction of justice because it is integral to ensuring that a just polis is not overthrown,
from either within or without, by unjust men. But too much aggression is inimical to
justice, as it causes unnecessary conflict. Rationality then is key to the establishment of
the proper balance of aggression. However, the three different texts provide different
accounts of what form this rationality takes. Both the Republic and the Statesman
suggest that this rationality will take the form of a single man, whether a philosopherking or a statesman, who will then properly order the polis such that aggression will not
cause unjust wars. But in the Republic the philosopher-king, in addition to controlling
the aggression of the city, must properly handle the appetitive aspect of the soul. If this
aspect is not controlled, the polis will go to war for the resources necessary to obtain
affluence. The philosopher-king and the statesman, by using their rationality, control the
souls of the citizens in similar ways: Through education, breeding, contests, tests and
excommunication. These extreme measures are not available in the Laws. Instead, law is
used as a result of the collective rationality of the entire polis. In The Republic, The
Statesman and The Laws, both rationality and aggression are necessary for the
construction of justice.
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Plato turned towards the human soul, rather than the divinities or the cosmos, in
order to construct justice. In delving into the human psyche to search for guidelines for
either living a just life or constructing a just polis, Plato also pointed out the origins of

war: human aggression. However, unlike Thucydides, who had also found the origins of
war in human nature, Plato did not despair about the possibility of creating justice,
whether that means living a just life or creating a just polis. For while war could destroy
a just polis, it was also necessary for the creation of a just polis in a similar way that a
just man must have some form of aggression in him in order to stand up to forces of
injustice. In the next chapter Aristotle would build upon this connection between justice
and war in his Politics.
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Aristotle built upon the relationship among war, justice and human psychology
that Plato had begun to outline. But what truly differentiates Aristotle from Plato in
terms of justice and war is that Aristotle explicitly stated the proper relationship between
the two. While Plato had begun to construct his theory about the proper relationship
between war and peace in the Laws (628d), Aristotle plainly stated that war should
always be fought for the sake of peace (Politics 1333a30). This peaceful telos of war,
along with several other factors, leads us to see that Aristotle supported some of the
central principles of what would become Western Just War Theory. However, several of
the causes of war, such as war for the sake of enslavement and for resources, which are
completely contrarian to Just War Theory, Aristotle argued were just by nature. But it is
important to note that, regardless of the reasons that he gave, Aristotle wrote of war as
something that needed to be justified ethically. The need for this justification implies that
some wars are unjust, presumably those fought for the wrong telee.
Aristotle descrbied several possible telee for just wars: the acquisition of
property, the establishment of proper leadership and peace. The establishment of proper
leadership includes enslaving those who are slaves by nature and also rulership over
those who are incapable of ruling themselves (cite). Aristotle was content to define peace
among poleis as simply the absence of war. However, peace within a polis is more
complex. Within a polis peace is rather the establishment of an order that is in harmony
with nature. In a way, Aristotle returned to a view of justice that is similar to Herodotos:
humans are part of the cosmos and the cosmos is just. Unlike Herodotos, however,
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Aristotle believed that neither fate nor the cosmos will establish peace and justice. Like
Plato, Aristotle argued that humans must choose to construct peace and justice. For
peace within a polis should properly be used for the pursuit of virtue. These virtues
require an orderly structuring of the human soul.
Unlike Plato, however, Aristotle did not see war as something necessary for the
proper cultivation of the human soul. While military training was necessary for the
protection of the polis, war and military training had no intrinsic value for a virtuous soul.
Because he rejected the possibility of war or military affairs having value in and of
themselves, Aristotle departed from the Greek creative warfare tradition. We have seen
evidence of military affairs having some sort of intrinsic value in Herodotos, Thucydides
and Plato. For those writers, warfare was necessary for cultivating a certain toughness
that was required for mere survival or for the maintenance of justice itself. But Aristotle
could only justify war by its outcomes: the protection or establishment of a just polis. A
just polis, in turn, was meant to produce conditions that cultivate virtues in the human
soul.
While Plato had found the origins of war within the human soul, Aristotle saw
war as a natural process, an activity that is potentially in harmony with the cosmos.
Classifying war as such a process made sense for Aristotle, as humans were a type of
animal, the polikon zoon, who have specific purposes as natural beings (1253a2).
Therefore, as a natural process, war is acceptable for them to practice provided that they
use it to achieve the telos that is in accordance with nature. But while war is a natural
process, Aristotle did not place the origins of war with fate, as had Herodotos. Like
Thucydides and Plato, Aristotle saw war as originating from humanity. But because he
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saw humanity as part of nature, Aristotle was inclined to call human psychological
impulses natural.
While Aristotle does not directly state that human nature is the origin of war,
indirectly he mentioned two aspects of the human soul that could be called the origins of
war: spiritedness and acquisition. However, unlike the spiritedness mentioned in any of
Plato's works, which seems to be more of a willingness or desire for conflict, spiritedness
for Aristotle is "a commanding and an unconquerable thing."(1327b36) War arises from
spiritedness because of a person's desire either not to be conquered or their desire to
command others. But Aristotle also saw war as arising from the need for acquisition.
This acquisition is not like the appetite that Plato described in the Republic, as that
appetite is used interchangeably to describe a desire for more resources and also the
hunger for food and sex. Instead, this acquisition is concerned with the establishment of
either a household or a polis. Aristotle mentioned how war arises from acquisition in his
description of domestic affairs:
Accordingly, if nature makes nothing purposeless or in vain, all animals
must have been made by nature for the sake of men. It also follows that
the art of war is in some sense a natural mode of acquisition (1256b15).
For Aristotle, acquisition is not so much about fulfilling some inner desire as it is taking
what one is entitled to by nature. For in his view, there are objects, animals and other
humans existing in nature that humans are entitled to use. War is justified for Aristotle if
one intends to use these resources, from objects to humans, in accordance with nature.
To Aristotle, there is a political hierarchy that is justified by nature. I will not go
into much detail about what Aristotle saw as the proper hierarchy, which included the
social positioning of women and children. But what is important for us in this paper is
that Aristotle thought Greeks were entitled to rule over barbarians, and that within the
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Greek population there were some who were entitled to mastery while others were slaves
by nature (1255a3). Because Aristotle saw this arraignment as justified by nature, he
approved the use of war, a natural process, to attain this state.
Aristotle did not mention that there are any restrictions on the proper way to
conduct this war. This lack of discussion of any sort of ius in bello is unusual, as it was
mentioned explicitly by Herodotos and Thucydides. Plato gave detailed guidelines for
ius in bello in his description of the kallipolis. But Aristotle did not make mention
restrictions or guidelines for how to fight a war in the Politics. However, by explicitly
outlining the proper reasons for going to war, which primarily concerns the telos of a
war, Aristotle lays the groundwork for ius ad bellum thought.
A just war for Aristotle is one that seeks to establish the natural hierarchy of
Greeks over non-Greeks and masters over slaves. A just war, then, is one that combines,
in the proper way, the desire for acquisition and the desire to be unconquered and to
command others. By combine properly, I mean that those who deserve to acquire by
nature are allowed to do so and those who are spirited and deserve to remain
unconquered are allowed to do so:
Training for war should not be pursued with a view to enslaving people
who do not deserve such a fate. Its objects should be these: first, to
prevent us from ever becoming enslaved ourselves; secondly, to put us in
a position to exercise leadership, but leadership directed to the interest of
those who are ruled, and not to the establishment of a general system of
slavery; and thirdly, to enable us to make ourselves masters of those who
naturally deserve to be slaves (1333b37).
It should be noted that even the principle that Aristotle shares with Just War Theory, that
wars of defense are just, is argued in terms of this natural hierarchy. For in Just War
Theory, wars of defense are framed as a sovereign power exercising its right to protect its
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sovereignty. Aristotle does not have such a concept of sovereignty. A war is justified
only if the power that fights it is justified by nature. This is to say, the only wars that are
just are those which are concerned with either the defense of or the establishment of an
Aristotelian government.
Because war is not a telos, but only something that can serve to either protect or
establish a polis, poleis that view fighting war and the preparation of war as their primary
purpose are unjust. In this way, Aristotle built upon the critiques of Sparta and Crete that
Plato had begun in the Laws. Aristotle critiqued the Spartan constitution not only on
purely theoretical grounds, but also by the current dissolution of its hegemonia:
Today the Spartans have lost their empire (uparchei); and we can all see
for ourselves that they are not a happy community and that their legislator
was not a good one…There is another reason why a city should not be
considered happy, or its legislator praised, when its citizens are trained for
victory in war and the subjugation of neighboring poleis. Such a policy
involves a great risk of injury. (1333b5-29)
He goes onto argue that instead of focusing on dominating outsiders, a successful
legislator should focus on dominating the inhabitants of his polis and establishing peace
and justice. While modern readers would attribute such language to a totalitarian
government, Aristotle emphasized, "Ruling over freemen is a finer thing and one more
connected with goodness, than ruling despotically."(1333b28) But while Aristotle only
considered as just those wars which are fought to establish or protect a particular political
establishment, he did not seem to consider unjust wars particularly tragic.
While he did not lament over the horrors of war, Aristotle nonetheless condemned
as unjust those poleis that do not fight wars for the sake of peace. Aristotle did not
consider these wars to be unjust because they needlessly violate the peace of other poleis
or even because they needlessly kill people, a central argument to modern critiques of
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unjust warsxliv. Instead, those who initiated the war are fighting for the wrong reasons, as
they are confused about the natural order of human affairs:
The whole of life is also divided- into work and leisure, and into war and
peace; and of actions some are necessary and useful whereas others are
noble. And in these actions it is necessary to make the same choice as
regards the parts of the soul and the actions of those parts: War must be
for the sake of peace, work for the sake of leisure and things necessary and
useful for the sake of the noble (1333a30).
These noble things, which are only attainable with peace and leisure, Aristotle mentioned
in greater detail in the Nichomachean Ethics, but in the Politics he briefly described the
life for which all strive: a life of virtue consisting of the goods of the body, goods of the
soul and external goods, such as the wealth necessary to live a good life (1323a21).
Therefore, those who lead unjust wars are not unjust not so much because they are doing
harm to others but rather because they are denying themselves the chance to attain a good
life. Because this good life is one that is in harmony with the cosmos, for Aristotle,
unjust wars are unnatural both for the aggressors and those whom they attack.
This passage also shows us that Aristotle did not find anything worthwhile in war
itself. War is strictly a means to an end: the creation of peace. This rejection of any
intrinsic value of war is another way that Aristotle laid the groundwork for Western Just
War Theory. For Just War Theory frames discussion of war as something that is
necessary for the establishment of either peace or freedom, never as something that is
necessary for the human condition. Herodotos had seen war as necessary for the
accumulation of honor. Thucydides saw war as needed in order to attain power, a natural
human impulse. Plato needed some sort of militarism to ensure that the citizens' souls
were properly fierce in order to ensure that a just regime could exist. But for Aristotle,
war is only worthwhile as a process for the establishment of peace. The concerns of how
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to attain honor or even the expenditure of human aggression through war are completely
disregarded by Aristotle.
It seems that the only remnant of creative war tradition within Aristotle's thought
is that of military training. Military training is necessary for the leadership, even if they
never actually experience war (1333b37). Even this military training differs from
creative warfare in an essential way: Aristotle justified this training by its telos, rather
than finding something intrinsically worthwhile (1334a11). However, it could be argued
that creative warfare is telological, as it is primarily concerned with the acquisition of
honor. If we take this position, then if Aristotle justified military training by appealing
towards honor, he would still be within the creative warfare tradition. But Aristotle does
not. Like all other activities, Aristotle measured the usefulness of military training by its
ability to produce a life of virtuous contemplation.
Aristotle saw the cosmos as amicable to peace and the cultivation of human
virtue. War was a necessity in order to establish the polis in which humans could gather
and attain the goods necessary to live a virtuous life: external goods, goods of the body
and goods of the soul. Because war was necessary for this cosmologically ordained
condition, it was in a sense justified. Aristotle did not explicitly condemn wars that do
not have the purpose of establishing this type of regime. But given his arguments against
regimes that are not centered around the goal of attaining this telos of human life, we can
surmise that he would have considered those wars unjust. Because Aristotle saw the
establishment of peace the only reason to fight a war, he placed himself against the Greek
creative war tradition, in which fighting war had some intrinsic value. Aristotle did
concede that military training is necessary for leadership, but not actual combat. By
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describing war only as a means towards some goal, and in particular a means that needs
to be justified, Aristotle began to lay the ground work for an ethical discourse that could
be used to judge total war.

xliv
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The purpose of this paper was to make explicit how Herodotos, Thucydides, Plato
and Aristotle wrote about war in terms of right and wrong. It was necessary to make this
conversation explicit, for while all four authors wrote extensively on either war or justice,
none of them discussed at length the proper relationship between war and justice. Before
turning to the texts, I outlined two different ideas about war -creative war and total warand showed that during the time period I examined, Greek warfare shifted from creative
war towards total war. All four writers touched upon these two concepts, whether as an
analysis of the wars they observed or the basis of a guideline of how wars should be
fought. The concept of a just war is an idea that was present in all four authors, albeit in
very different forms. The idea of what made a war just or unjust had to be inferred from
the two historians. They presented their accounts as objective, but I believe that I was
successful in teasing out how they wrote of some wars as right and others as wrong. My
task for the other two authors, the philosophers, was different. For they had written about
justice but not at length on what made a war just or unjust. Therefore, I examined what
they had written about war and attempted to contextualize it within their thoughts on
justice.
While there was a form of justice within the creative wars in Ancient Greece, it
was a justice associated with the honor of the fighters. This is to say that justice was
ensuring that the man who had earned a particular honor in life or death had received the
proper respect. To provide men with the opportunity to accumulate honor through battle
was the primary purpose of creative warfare. Therefore, in ideal creative warfare, there
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are only willing participants and the results of the battle are of little significance. The
result would be of little significance because the battle had not been fought in order to
determine any political decision but rather solely for the accumulation of honor. All the
participants would be willing because only those who were interested in gaining honor
through fighting would fight. There is no tyranny in this war because no one is coerced
into fighting and no one's livelihood is at stake.
However, there is no document of any pure creative warfare existing in ancient
Greece. The longest text on Greek honorific warfare, the Iliad, makes clear both that
there were many unwilling participants and that political outcomes lay in the balance as a
result of the war. That the Greeks were willing to use a decidedly ignoble tactic to win
the Trojan War shows that another concept also existed at this time: total war. Total war
is the thought that war is fought for an expressly political reason, often for the purpose of
obtaining freedom for oneself or for taking it away from another. Because what is at
stake is a matter of either survival, liberty or both, there are no restrictions on how to
fight.
The history of Greek warfare shows the shift towards total warfare and away from
creative warfare. This shift can be seen by how honor decreased in importance on the
battlefield while there was an increase in tactics that blurred the distinction between war
and peace . An example of this blurred distinction is the use of siege warfare, which was
clearly warfare but also did not resemble the hoplite battles that dominated Greek
imagination. Part of the reason that the Greeks had focused on hoplite battles was
because honor and fighting honorably remained important despite the increased political
nature of this warfare. The rise of siege warfare showed the emerging desire to win at
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any cost rather than win honorably. The decrease of the importance of honor can also be
seen by the increased importance of dishonorable types of militaries, such as peltasts and
navies. Both were seen as dishonorable not only because they were fought by the lower
classes, but their fighting methods eschewed direct melee, which required an honorable
sort of bravery in Greek thought. The peltasts fought from afar while the rowers did not
even necessarily see their opponents. Greek wars were eventually primarily determined
by navies that relied on the strength of lower class rowers, indicating a complete shift
from aristocratic warriors that dominated Homeric war.
The multitude of changes that occurred within Greek militaries should remind us
of the importance of the context of which these writers wrote. Therefore, we must
consider that one of the reasons for the difference of opinion on the nature of the origins
of war was the different wars that they either lived through or could call upon as
examples. The importance of context also applies to what they thought were just wars.
For example, Aristotle did not have seen hoplites in the same way as Herodotos.
Herodotos recorded the battle of Marathon as a symbol of the superiority of Greek
phalanx over Persian military. But for Aristotle, who wrote the Politics in the second
half of the fourth century, hoplites were only one position amidst many in a military, for
peltasts and navies were of great importance for militaries at that time.
While Herodotos recorded acts of Greek heroism, he also recorded a particular
way of judging war. The stories that he told about the Persians indicate not only that he
thought that their invasion of Greece was unjust, but also their wars of conquest over
other people were unjust. For all the stories that Herodotos told about Persian leaders
who began wars of conquest result with that leader either being killed, defeated or set
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back in another way or form. This particular shape of his narratives is explained as a
result of the cosmos. For Herodotos believed both in fate and divine intervention in
human affairs. As the gods and fate were interested in establishing justice, the cosmos,
given time, would avenge injustices, which in this case were unjust wars. Such actions
Herodotos did not find particularly remarkable, as he believed that the cosmos was just
and would act in such a way as to retain the harmony that had been lost when an injustice
had occurred.
Aristotle also believed in the possibility of attaining a just relationship with the
cosmos. Unlike Herodotos, he did not trust the cosmos to do this for humanity. Rather,
humans must make the proper decisions in order to attain justice and other virtues and
fulfill their natures in the best way. The virtue of justice resulted from living within a just
community, which is to say a setting which provided one with the opportunity to become
a virtuous person. War was necessary to found this community, as it required resources
and slave labor, both of which can be obtained through war. War was also justified to
protect this community. This community would have to be one in which the proper
people were slaves and the proper people were rulers. Polities in which improper people
were rulers would not be just and would not fight just wars, as they would be acting
contrary to the interests of their regime. For Aristotle, an unjust regime could not fight a
just war, as that war would not be concerned with creating a peace that would allow for
the pursuit of virtue. Additionally, a regime, which had the potential to foster virtue,
because it had the proper resources and people, that regime's wars could only be just if
the wars were intended to establish peace. Wars fought for the sake of fighting war, even
by a properly ordered regime, would be unjust. Like Herodotos, Aristotle saw nature and
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the cosmos as the ultimate judge of whether something is just. But Aristotle required
humans to follow a particular path in order to reach this harmony with nature.
Thucydides appealed to nature in order to explain human action. But unlike
Aristotle, who saw a real possibility for justice to exist on earth, Thucydides appealed to
human nature to explain the greed and fear that he saw as the primary motivators of
human action. Because this flawed human nature was the primary cause of all wars and
all political affairs, any attempt to find justice amongst humanity was futile; justice was
only a word. In order to best understand human affairs one had to understand power.
But while this emphasis on power is what Thucydides wrote explicitly, a nuanced reading
of his text reveals that he was concerned with justice. For he attempted to shock his
readers with the horrors at the Corcyrian revolution or with the plague of Athens. If
humans viewed war in the amoral way that Thucydides suggested, why would his adverse
reaction suggest that not only are these events unnecessary but could have occurred in a
better, more just way? Why would the politicians need to lie and equivocate? For in the
speeches that he recorded, Thucydides noted that politicians frequently lied about who
attacked first and confuse the threat of an attack with an actual attack. Their hypocrisy
demonstrates that there was a way to think morally about these military decisions. The
resistance to thinking morally about war is thought to be best illustrated by the Athenians
at Melos. But if their understanding of human nature is so accurate, why do they proceed
to fail so horribly at Sicily? I suggested that readers may take the Melian dialogue as a
condemnation of Athenian moral reasoning as the polis slides into hubris rather than a
defense of an amoral understanding of politics. All these approaches to Thucydides' text
suggest that there was some sort of moral understanding of war, what were just reasons to
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go to war and what were just ways to fight war, all ideas against which Thucydides was
writing. Thucydides had to write against them in order to establish the tragic sensibility
about the impossibility of the attainment of justice in a world overrun by war.
Like Aristotle, Plato did not choose either the pessimism of Thucydides nor the
optimism of Herodotos. Unlike Aristotle, Plato did not seek to define justice as being in
accordance with the cosmos. Instead, justice is solely a human affair and its attainment
requires the human soul to make some sort of harmony with itself rather than with the
cosmos. In order for the human soul to become properly balanced, two aspects of the
soul must be properly controlled: The appetites for worldly goods and human
spiritedness. Aggression must be controlled but not eliminated, as without it neither a
polis nor a person would have the necessary toughness to ensure that a just state is
defended from unjust persons. The appetites must be controlled and not eliminated not
only because humans cannot live without worldly goods but also because justice requires
more than what is available in poverty. A balance of sufficiency should be struck
between poverty and affluence just as a balance should be struck between meekness and
aggressiveness. The key to attaining this balance is intellect. Plato saw intellect, or
rationality, as the hope for establishing justice amidst humanity. For intellect, whether
through the rule of the philosopher-king, the statesman or the laws, as a sort of collective
rationality, could guide the souls of the polis to properly balance their spiritedness and
appetites. Plato, like Aristotle, argued that war should always be fought for the sake of
peace. But unlike Aristotle, who found such policies to have a justification in the
cosmos, Plato examined at the psychological roots and effects of such policies when
attempting to find the relationship between war and justice.
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To attempt to find justice in war is a daunting enterprise. The cruelty and
suffering which are the hallmarks of war seem completely irreconcilable with any notion
of justice. For justice, in some fundamental sense, is about the ways humans should
interact with each other. Creative warfare has an easy time reconciling these two
concepts as that particular type of war has low political stakes and all the fighters are
fighting voluntarily. But to attempt to find some way to relate justice to total war, which
involves the risk of the destruction of your farmland and home, the loss of your family
and friends and loss of your freedom, is much harder. Many say it is impossible, and take
either pacifist or realpolitik positions that deny that justice is related to war in the
slightest. However, there is a peculiar moral abhorrence about war, the way that it
demands some form of resistance; for if one does not acknowledge war, one will be
destroyed by it. Michel Walzer elaborates on this horror, explaining it as, "the ultimate
tyranny: those who resist aggression are forced to imitate, and perhaps even to exceed,
the brutality of the aggressor."xlv
As philosophers, Plato and Aristotle failed to convey the sense of violation that
accompanies a war of aggression. Both were content to describe an unjust war as an
unsuccessful way to achieve virtue. The historians Herodotos and Thucydides did
manage to capture the magnitude of war and how much people suffered on its account. I
noted at the beginning that the Greeks wrote extensively on war and on justice but failed
to develop a coherent just war doctrine. Was Christianity, with its steadfast belief of
justice in the afterlife, a requirement for the formation of a moral analysis of one of
humankind's most immoral activities? I do not know. Perhaps the Greeks knew in some
form that to think morally about war, which given their nuanced thinkers they were
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perfectly capable of doing, would force them to reevaluate the entirety of their society.
For no one can deny that the Greeks were a war-like people, and while they were also
peace loving people, war was central to their society.

The thin-lipped armorer,
Hephaestos, hobbled away,
Thetis of the shining breasts
Cried out in dismay
At what the god had wrought
To please her son, the strong
Iron-hearted man-slaying Achilles
Who would not live long.

The Shield of Achilles W. H. Auden
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